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I. INTRODUCTION
Internationally, organ transplantation has been established as a
feasible solution to the problem of end-stage organ failure. As medical
technology and surgical techniques improve, the capability for successful
organ transplantation grows, which in turn, allows people who were once
classified as terminally ill to dramatically extend their lives.' As organ
transplantation becomes a more available therapy, the demand for
transplantable organs increases. Unfortunately, not all countries have taken
measures to increase domestic supplies of transplantable organs in order
to meet the rising demand. Part of the cause of some countries' organ
shortages is the mixed goals of their organ procurement laws; in others,
society's moral or cultural biases against organ harvesting prevents
effective organ procurement. Some countries have not developed a
comprehensive system of organ procurement, leaving those in need of an
organ to find one for themselves.
Obviously, a shortage of transplantable organs results in death when
potential recipients do not receive a transplant in time. However, other
problems are developing due to the worldwide organ deficit. International-
ly, one of the most pronounced problems is the human rights violationsoccurring as a result of the highly questionable, if not illegal, methods of
satisfying organ demands.2 The current shortage of legally collected
J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law (1994).
James Warren, A Literal Gift of Life; Organ Donations Are Saving Lives, But a
Shrinking Donor Pool has Caused Many to Re-Evaluate the System for Transplants,
L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 18, 1992, at 14.
One-year success rates for most organ transplants are in the 70% to 90% range; an as-
tounding 300,000 tissue transplants are performed each year, more than 40,000 Ameri-
cans regained their sight in 1991 because of a comeal transplant, and a new generation
of powerful immunosuppressive drugs to treat rejection are in various stages of clinical
Id. trials and are expected to be available in the mid-1990s.
2 See Audrey Magee, MEPs Vote to Ban Trade in Organs for Transplant, IR.
Tims, Sept. 15, 1993, at 2 (noting that "there was a chronic shortage of transplant
organs which not only reduced opportunities to save lives but also increased the danger
of fraud or even more serious crimes[]"). See also infra notes 33-77 and accompanying
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organs is due to the lack of efficacy of most domestic laws, the lack of
legislative consistency from nation to nation, and the lack of consistent
and aggressive enforcement of such laws.3 The variation between legal
systems has allowed abuse of the simplest method of organ procurement
- organ sales from live donors. This system is generally poorly regulated
and fraught with health risks to both the donor and recipient. Often, it is
the poorer citizens of developing countries who are supplying organs for
the members of the upper class who can afford them, either directly or
through organ brokers. However, when the organ, like any other valuable
commodity, cannot be bought, it is stolen resulting in flagrant violations
of human rights.
Since organ demand generally is not met through legal methods of
collection,4 there are a significant number of people suffering and dying
in hospitals5 who could not only be living normal lives, but expending
fewer hospital resources.' An organ deficit forces doctors to decide which
patient receives an organ and which one does not.7 Desperate patients
who feel they can no longer wait for an organ to be legally supplied, and
who can afford the high cost, look to the black market for organs.' If the
demand for human organs was met legally and cheaply, there would be
little incentive to seek organs illegally. A legal high organ procurement
rate would, therefore, lead to the eventual elimination of the human rights
violations inherent in the human organ black market.
Assuming that saving lives is the goal of any organ procurement and
transplantation program,9 each nation should enact uniform legislation
text.
' C.R. Stiller, Ethics of Transplantation, in ONTARIO MINISTRY OF HEALTH, ORGAN
DONATION IN THE EIGHTIES: THE MINISTER'S TASK FORCE ON KIDNEY DONATION app.
(1986).
Efficiency varies tremendously from center to center both with respect to organ retrieval
and organ transplantation. As a result, wide disparities in supply and demand occur with
a resulting situation in which programs have excess organs while individuals in other
locations, desperate for a transplant, become susceptible to a commercial endeavor.
Id. at 10.
4 Charles K. Hawley, Antitrust Problems and Solutions to Meet the Demand for
Transplantable Organs, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 1101, 1102.
' Thomas G. Peters, Life or Death: The Issue of Payment in Cadaveric Organ Do-
nation, 265 JAMA 1302, 1302 (1991).
6 Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a
Futures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 39 (1989).
" Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, 14
J. HEALTH, POL. POL'Y & L. 57, 79 (1989).
See infra notes 13-30 and accompanying text.
This is not the goal of all organ procurement systems. See infra note 12.
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allowing for the procurement of as many organs as possible from the
potential pool of adequate cadavers and willing living donors. However,
there are numerous restraints that differ greatly from region to region,
country to country, and religion to religion, which prevent the thorough
collection of organs.'" These factors include, but are not limited to, the
education of the public concerning the benefits of organ donation; the
attitude of the public toward organ donation; the attitude of the govern-
ment and health professionals toward organ collection; moral or ethical
objections to organ donations resulting from religious or cultural traditions
or enacted laws; the possible property rights the donor or his family
might have in the organs; the civil or privacy rights the donor may have
in the disposition of the body; the cost of the transplant operation;
hospital resources for transplants; organ resources for transplants; political
or social motives to be accomplished with organ donation; and the deter-
mination of time of death in relation to the usefulness of the cadaveric
organs. The ideal legal philosophy should attempt to promote prodigious
collection while retaining flexibility, so as to accommodate local objec-
tions to certain practices."
Section II of this Note addresses the existence of international forces
of supply and demand for transplantable human organs, and discusses
why domestic organ demand is not limited to national borders. Section III
documents the crimes being committed by individuals and states as a
result of the worldwide inadequacy of organ procurement legislation.
Section IV examines the current patchwork of domestic laws in an effort
to determine what states can do to maximize the safe, effective, and so-
cially equitable collection of human organs for transplantation. 2 Section
V addresses the principles of international law under which one country
can prosecute another country, or its nationals' for the absence of human
rights abuses. Section VI concludes that the worldwide harmonization of
domestic legislation, which would enact an organ procurement system,
'o See infra notes 78-230 and accompanying text.
" Cohen, supra note 6, at 11-12. The varying systems of organ procurement "have
much in common as they are all motivated by similar values. Each seeks to preserve
life and reduce suffering, and at the same time to honor the autonomy of the individu-
al and respect the property right that he and his family have in his body." Id.
2 It should be noted that while this is the general philosophy in organ procurement,
not all states follow it. The U.S. Task Force on Organ Transplantation, in forming its
organ procurement philosophy, "believed in the importance of developing organ trans-
plantation policies that promote 'the value of social practices that enhance and strength-
en altruism and our sense of community."' James F. Blumstein, Federal Organ
Transplant Policy: A Time for Reassessment?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 451, 466 (1989)
(quoting U.S. DEP'T OF HEAL.TH & HUMAN SERV., ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: ISSUES
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1986)).
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presuming the consent of the individual to donate organs while maintain-
ing the option to withdraw consent, will best alleviate the demand for
transplantable organs. This system should also provide a framework for
the extraterritorial prosecution of human rights violators, thereby eliminat-
ing the existence of the black market.
IX. THE EXISTENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET IN HUMAN
ORGANS
Modem techniques of organ transplantation have so substantially
increased the viability of organ transplantation as a worldwide therapy
that 300,000 people annually receive an organ transplant.'3 The medical
advances in transplantation techniques, incredible for their growing
success rate, have resulted in increased need for transplantable organs.'4
The advent of immunosuppressant drugs that increase compatibility
between donors, preservation techniques that allow for increased organ
life outside of the body, increased effectiveness of recipient registries,
greater numbers of transplant teams that can transport organs, and more
skilled surgeons who can perform the surgery has changed organ trans-
13 Discovery Journal: The Great Organ Bazaar (Discovery Channel television broad-
cast, Mar. 23, 1993) [hereinafter Organ Bazaar]. See also David Price & Ronnie
Mackay, The Trade in Human Organs, NEw W., Sept. 20, 1991, at 1272 (stressing
that "we have regularly witnessed in the field of transplantation procedures which, only
a few years earlier, would have been viewed as incredible, even miraculous . . . [these]
procedures have now ceased to be viewed as experimental, and are highly successful,
almost standard treatments for certain conditions[]").
" In 1985, commentators had already noted that "the demand in recent years has
risen significantly because [of medical] improvements . . . . Unfortunately, the supply
of donor organs has not kept pace with the increased demand, resulting in greater
shortages than ever before." Note, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. L.
REV. 1015, 1018-19 (1985). At that time, nearly 6,000 people were waiting on dialysis
for a kidney transplant. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversights
of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 128 (1983)
(testimony of Donald W. Denny). As of September 30, 1992, there were 21,492 regis-
trations in the United States for a kidney transplant. Hartford Transplant Center, ORGAN
AND TISSUE DONATION: WHAT ARE THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE INDIVIDUAL PHYSI-
CIAN? (Sept. 30, 1992) (on file with the Case W. Res. J. Int'l L.). This number will
continue to grow, as there are almost 1,000 new names added each month to the list
of people waiting for an organ transplant. Organ Bazaar, supra note 13. As of early
March, 1993, UNOS reported that over 31,000 people were waiting for an organ
transplant in the United States. UNOS Releases 1992 Transplant Statistics, PR
NEWSWIRE, Apr. 16, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Pmews File. It has been
estimated that there are another 75,000 candidates for an organ transplant who simply
do not have the money to get on a waiting list. Scott Shepard, Diamond Aims to Spark
National Debate on Organ-Procurement Issues, MEM. Bus. J., Aug. 16, 1993, at 14.
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plantation from an experimental scientific phenomenon to an accepted
solution to organ failure. 5
Unfortunately, there have not been similar advances in creating laws
that facilitate increasing the supply of organs to meet the demand." The
initial effect of the demand for transplantable organs was a deficit on the
domestic level, with the effect on particular states determined by distinct
supply and demand factors. Local demand for transplantable organs is
determined by the number of patients diagnosed as potential organ
transplant recipients. 7 With the increased availability of medical technol-
ogy making organ transplantation more of a therapy, as opposed to an ex-
perimental option, the number of patients who could be saved, but die
due to a lack of transplantable organs, also increases. 8
However, according to current classifications of patients who need a
transplantable organ, a sufficient supply of potentially transplantable
organs exists to meet the demand for almost every type of organ. 9 The
problem is that these potential donor organs are not being adequately
collected by the states. This means that, on any given day, for each
patient who dies for lack of a transplantable organ, an equal or greater
number of viable organs are buried in the ground." While some may
look at this as merely a social problem, the forces of supply and demand
in this allocation system have created a market, albeit a black market, for
15 Hawley, supra note 4, at 1106-07.
16 DAvID MEYERS, THE HuMAN BODY AND THE LAW 182-83 (2d ed. 1990) (stating
that "[t]here are many who feel that ... legal problems are the greatest present
impediment or roadblock to progress in human organ transplantation[]"). See generally
Theodore Silver, The Case for a Post-Mortem Organ Draft Act and A Proposed Model
Organ Draft Act, 68 B.U. L. REV. 681 (1988) (discussing the failure of current organ
procurement laws to produce an adequate organ supply).
'" Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, The Economics and Ethics of Alternative
Cadaveric Organ Procurement Policies, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 403, 413 (1991) (ex-
plaining that "[i]f kidneys were not employed as an input in the production of
transplant operations, there would be no demand for these organs . . . demand is
derived from the demand for transplant operations which, in turn, is derived from the
demand for health[]").
,S Cohen, supra note 6, at 4-5.
,9 Id. at 6 (stating that "the current untapped supply of cadavers appears to be
more than adequate to meet the current demand of all organs, with the possible but
doubtful exception of the heart[]").
2 Id. at 4.
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human organs. It is obvious that in its current condition, most state
allocation schemes are failing as effective suppliers of donor organs.'
These problems are not only are domestic, but increasingly, they take
on an international dimension due to the failure of domestic allocation
schemes and the increasing relative ease of organ transplantation. There
are many reports of nationals of a particular country traveling to a foreign
country in search of a transplantable organ.' The result is that patients
are traveling to the countries with the fewest restrictions on the sources
of organs and the methods of procuring these organs.' In the current
international market, this is reflected by the fact that organs are being
bought and traded, virtually unregulated, in some countries.2 States that
cannot meet their domestic demand are, in effect, forcing their citizens to
travel elsewhere for life-saving treatment,26 encouraging an international
market that survives on violations of basic human rights and organ sales
by the poor.
Such an international procurement scheme is ineffective and undesir-
able. The challenge is to identify the form the international market should
take, and the domestic policies that would best encourage such an interna-
tional market. States need to determine what rights they have under
international law in creating minimum standards to be adhered to by other
states. This challenge should be met, not only because it can have a
21 DAVID LAMB, ORGAN TRANSPLANTS AND EMICS 135 (1990)
The sale of human organs is no longer a myth and the wealthiest can buy life at the
expense of the underprivileged .... Very many countries, be they poor or very rich,
are also confronted with the increasing development of an organ market, whatever the
ostensible ethics and whatever the legislation.
id. (quoting REP. OF THE CONF. OF EtuR. HEALTH MINISTERS 15 (1987)).
' Hansmann, supra note 7, at 60 (noting that only 15% of the 20,000 viable
United States organ donors actually had their organs harvested).
See infra notes 13-30 and accompanying text.
24 Maud Beelman, Body Parts Needed for Transplants: Trade in Human Organs
Stirs Global Attention, L.A. TIMEs, July 16, 1989, at A6 (stating that "[t]he forces of
supply and demand in the desperate world of organ transplants have created a commer-
cial trade in human organs that worries health officials and ethicists worldwide[]").
21 RENIE C. Fox & JuDITH P. SWAZEY, SPARE PARTS: ORGAN REPLACEMENT IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY 68 (1992) (noting that "[b]y 1990, trafficking in 'human spare
parts' was a booming business in developing countries such as India, which had no
organized systems for procuring cadaveric donor organs, no brain death statute, and no
specific laws banning the sale of human organs and tissues[]").
' See generally Charles P. Wallace, For Sale: The Poor's Body Parts, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 27, 1992, at Al (noting that "[tihe wealthy are motivated by the fact that dialysis
treatments, which can replace malfunctioning kidneys, are often prohibitively expensive
and can severely restrict a patient's lifestyle[]").
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positive impact on other states' markets, but because better organ pro-
curement methods elsewhere will positively affect their own domestic
market.' It is important for states to realize that the illegal trafficking of
human organs cannot be categorized as just a violation of basic human
rights. Such a crime is motivated, not by politics or religion, but by greed
for the potentially great profit available to unscrupulous organ brokers
dealing with both donors in dire need of money, and recipients in dire
need of organs.' Therefore, laws that deal with such criminals should
not be organized around policies that address primarily religious taboos
and cultural mores; rather these laws should seek to avoid the victimiza-
tion and exploitation of people, both domestically and internationally.
Ideally, every domestic system would operate in a similar, efficient
fashion, such that international problems and abuses could be averted. Of
course, this is quite unrealistic, if only because of the disparate medical
resources that exist between countries. Domestic concerns have naturally
been preeminent in formulating a national policy toward organ procure-
ment.29 However, it is not enough to limit policy decisions to immediate
domestic concerns. States must be aware that failure to satisfy demand
locally will have international ramifications. Similar to other international
markets, repercussions of the ill effects created by some domestic markets
in organ procurement will be felt by similar markets in other nations. For
example, consider the spread of disease through foreign organ trans-
plantation and the higher percentage of unnecessary organ recipient deaths
due to the lax medical standards which often accompany lax legal stan-
' If other countries' organ demands are met, nationals of those countries will have
a much lower incentive to enter another domestic market for transplantable organs,
thereby allowing a nation to allocate more organs for its own citizens. See Clarisse
Lucas, Egypt Becomes Crossroads for Trade in "Human Spare Parts," AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Jan. 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File (reporting that
Egypt banned the sale of kidneys to foreigners to meet their own needs, since Egypt's
rate of kidney failure is almost twice the world average). See also Judy Siegel, France
Bars Organ Transplants for Israelis, JERUSALEM POST, June 29, 1992, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Jpost File (explaining that a state has the right to exclude
foreigners from procuring domestic organs). Also, for those who participate in interna-
tional organ procurement agencies, such as Eurotransplant, the greater the number of or-
gans that participating countries procure, the greater the number of organs available for
all other participating countries. See generally Galina Vromen, Dutch Organ Transplant
Centre Gives Hope To Thousands, REUTER LIBR. REP., Dec. 30, 1988, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File.
' It is not uncommon in Bombay for an organ broker to make as much money
from the sale of the organ as the donor makes. Organ Bazaar, supra note 13.
' See, e.g., Blumstein, supra note 12, at 452-56. See also T.K.K. Iyer, Kidneys for
Transplant - "Opting Out" Law in Singapore, 35 FoRFNSiC Sci. INT'L 131 (1987).
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dards3 These are two of the many growing international problems, as
demonstrated in the following section.
IRI. PROBLEMS AND ABUSES OCCURRING DUE TO THE COEXISTENCE
OF DIFFERENT LAWS AND PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS
Few nations are meeting organ demand locally and as a result, more
people are traveling abroad hoping to acquire an organ. Transnational
travel for transplantable organs provides the basis for the assertion that
organ procurement must be examined as not just a collection of domestic
allocation systems, but as an international market. The domestic allocation
systems that are producing the fewest organs are essentially forcing their
citizens in need of an organ to obtain a transplant in a state that does not
have a shortage." In our current international market, the nations that
procure the greatest number of organs are those that allow their residents
to sell their organs and have them removed while they are still alive.
Unfortunately, empirical evidence suggests that this type of system
"start[s] with unregulated organ removal and end[s] with a vicious traffic
whereby the poor and uneducated [are] exploited in the interest of the
wealthy."'32 Further, such systems allow for human rights violations to
occur, and fail to meet medical standards that protect against the spread
of disease and infection. While one can argue that these are problems
endemic to a particular nation, and not the international market, careful
examination reveals this to be false for two reasons. First, if domestic
supply met domestic demand, people would not feel the need to travel to
risky, abusive markets to obtain organs. Second, patients who do travel
abroad to receive an organ sometimes return with a diseased or infected
organ that needs immediate emergency treatment in the patient's home
state.
Poor people are being exploited through unsafe, and often unethical,
sales of their kidneys, for paltry sums of money.33 While many may
3 Of 149 Singaporean kidney patients who went to India and China for transplants,
nine died and another nine had to have their implanted kidneys removed. "The others
returned with infections like hepatitis and AIDS, or had caught diseases like tuberculo-
sis, chicken pox, and malaria from improperly screened donors." Lisa Kong, The
Kidney Lottery, STRArrs TIMEs, May 27, 1992, at L2.
" However, the market with excess organs must also be willing to sell to for-
eigners.
" LAMB, supra note 21, at 135.
3 Fox & SwAzEY, supra note 25, at 66-67. Fox & Swazey relate that "a major
newspaper has described the buying of kidneys from impoverished donors for transplan-
tation in private hospitals in Western countries. Some donations were coerced, some for
meager fees .... It seems clear that ... the less privileged can be exploited to
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consider this a problem, there are some who prefer to look at inter-vivos
sales34 as a maximization of resources, where the patient receives a
much needed organ, and the donor receives some much needed money.
5
However, the numerous horror stories exemplifying such exploitation of
the poor and needy do, themselves, border on human rights violations.36
Additionally, the World Health Organization has condemned the trade in
human organs. 7
The list of human rights violations varies from state-sponsored
activities to those which are undertaken by mafia-like organ brokers who
arrange organ sales. The most common state-sponsored human rights
violation is the procurement of organs from criminals, both executed38
improve the health of the more privileged." Id. (quoting COUNCIL OF THE TRANSPLANT
SOCIETY 716 (1985)).
" An inter-vivos sale is one between a live donor and a live recipient. Hence, only
a non-necessary organ can be the subject of such a sale; for example, an eye, bone
marrow, or a paired kidney.
3S See Bjorn Edlund, West German Baron in Controversial Organ Business, REUTER
LIMR. REP., Oct. 27, 1988, available in LEXIS, New Library, Reuwld File. In 1988, a
West German baron attempted to start up an organ brokerage, offering live donors
$44,000 to sell a kidney. His selling point was, "[e]ven if the recipient of the kidney
does not survive - you will, both medically and financially." Id. See generally Organ
Bazaar, supra note 13.
1 In India, it was reported that a man sold one of his kidneys to raise money for
drugs, and that he was willing to sell one of his eyes to buy more drugs. India Moves
Tough Bill to Stop Trade in Human Organs, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 20, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File [hereinafter India Moves Tough]. One
desperate mother of four in Brazil was willing to sell her heart in return for jobs for
her unemployed children. Lisa Genasci, Organ Sales Legislation Could Cut Down Sales
of Human Organs, UPI, Nov. 8, 1986, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
Loan sharks in Japan are reported to have accepted human organs as repayment for
debts. Owen Bowcott, UK Disciplinary Hearing Exposes Third World Market for Donor
Organs, REUTER TEXTLINE GUARDIAN, Apr. 5, 1990, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Txprim File. Hotels in Cairo often put up young Somali, Nigerian, and
Sudanese men who are looking for potential buyers for their kidneys. Lucas, supra note
27.
3" Fox & SWAZEY, supra note 25, at 68 (noting that "[tihe World Health Organi-
zation thought that the practice had become so rampant and problematic that it issued
a resolution condemning trafficking in human organs, asking member nations to take
appropriate measures against it[]"); Gary Regenstreif, Kidneys for Cash Increases,
Sparks Moral Debate, REUTER LIBR. REP., Aug. 23, 1989, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Reuwld File.
38 Mariana Wan & Simon Beck, Organs of Prisoners Used in Ops, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, July 25, 1993, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Schina File.
A New York-based human rights group, Asia Watch, obtained a document dating back
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and living.39 According to a Bush administration study, a similar type of
crime has occurred in Bosnia, where a Serbian internment camp doctor is
alleged to have killed prisoners of war and removed their organs.'
While these state practices are abhorrent, the organ brokers that prey
upon the citizens of states that do not have effective organ procurement
systems are even more disturbing. These type of human rights violations,
many involving children,4' have been reported in Poland,42 Russia,43
to 1984 entitled "Temporary Regulations Concerning the Use of the Corpses and Bodily
Organs of Executed Criminals." This directive, allegedly issued by the six top govern-
ment departments, including the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's
Procuratorate, revealed that China has officially condoned the practice of harvesting
organs from executed prisoners, despite official denials to the contrary. Id. see also
Lynne O'Donnell, Organs Ripped from Executed Chinese Prisoners Make Money,
REUrER LIBR. REP., Nov. 21, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File.
In China, "[k]idneys are usually obtained from prisoners who are executed for offences
[sic] such as rape, burglary, or political 'crimes' against the state .... ." Id. (quoting
Dr. Law Siu-Keung of Hong Kong's Queen Mary Hospital). Other sources have con-
firmed this claim. See, e.g., Barbara Basler, Kidney Transplants in China Raise Concern
About Source, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1991, at Al. A prominent renal specialist, Dr. M.K.
Chan, explained that "[a]Ilmost all kidneys transplanted in China come from executed
prisoners. That's the main source, along with a few donated by living relatives." Id. In
one scenario described by the International League for Human Rights, if a patient
needed an eye transplant, the prisoner was shot in the heart. O'Donnell, supra note 38.
If a donor heart was needed, the prisoner was shot in the head. Id. The organs are
used not only for Chinese patients, but are also sold abroad. See Alexandra George,
Australian Woman Travels to China for Executed Man's Kidney, REUTER LIBR. REP.,
Sept. 5, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File. See also Basler, supra
note 38; Organ Bazaar, supra note 13.
"' "Filipino Death Row prisoners began donating organs in 1976 as a part of a
program to reduce overcrowding without resorting to widespread executions ....
[M]ost donor inmates avoided execution and some were freed after spending a few
more years in prison." Beelman, supra note 24. This practice became part of an organ
brokerage, in which Filipino prisoners were selling their organs through a Japanese
middle man to Japanese patients. Isagani de Castro, Philippines: For Sale Kidneys, at
Bargain Prices, INTER PRESS SERV., May 4, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Inpres File. See also Suvendrini Suguro, Japan: Controversy Brewing Over Overseas
Organ Transplants, INTER PRESS SERV., Aug. 12, 1988, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Inpres File.
0 Norman Kempster, New Study Cites Thousands of Bosnia Atrocities, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 1992, at A4.
41 Human Organs Sold by Poor for Transplants, Conference Told, XINHUA GEN.
NEws SERv., Aug. 22, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File ("Rosalie
Bertell, a member of the International Commission of Health Professionals, said that
children routinely disappear from the streets in some countries and are believed to be
slaughtered for their organs, or sold for adoption and prostitution."). Children in need
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Uruguay," Italy,45 Argentina,' and Brazil.47 The problem is believed
to be so severe that the United Nations has recommended an investigation
into the existence of an international network of buying and kidnapping
Latin American children for their organs.'
of a transplantable organ present a unique problem because, in many instances, a child
requires an organ from another child. Michael J. Butler, The Law of Human Organ
Procurement: A Modest Proposal, 1 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 195, 204
(1985), since an adult organ is often too large. Gordon Slovut, Transplants: A Look
Back, Ahead, STAR TRM., Sept. 30, 1993, at 1E. However, it is difficult to make a
baby-to-baby transplant succeed, due to the powerful disease-fighting immune system of
children. Id. See also Euro MPS Seek Transplant Laws, PRESS Ass'N. NEWSFILE, Sept.
14, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Panews File.
" Russian Mafia Controls Polish-German Trade in Kidneys, PAP POLISH PRESS
AGENCY, June 25, 1993 (alleging that "many Germans buy kidneys in Poland for
120,000 DM each and have doctors transplant them . . . . mhe Russian mafia (also)
exploits the anxieties of the terminally ill through press advertisements and direct
contacts with hospitals, in order to sell transplant organs . . . ").
43 See id.; Sales of Human Organs Thriving in Some Parts of the World (National
Public Radio broadcast, Nov. 27, 1993) [hereinafter Body Parts Documentary]. Accord-
ing to Colonel Yuri Dubiyegen, "[o]rgan transplantation is the most profitable business
in Russia and it will grow. Everyone knows that you can get away with abducting
people for a kidney or for any other organ and they're convinced the criminals can get
off scot-free." Id. See also Anthony Boadle, Film Exposes Black Market in Human
Body Parts, REUTER LIBRARY REPORT, Nov. 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Reuwld File (Commercial documents obtained by the makers of a documentary
entitled "The Body Parts Business" showed that one Russian company "sold 700 kid-
neys, hearts and lungs, 1400 livers, 18,000 thymus glands, 2000 eyes, and 3000 pairs
of testicles, which are used for rejuvenating creams.").
4' Uruguay Cracks Ring Selling Human Organs, CH. TRIB., Nov. 27, 1991, at CIO.
Police arrested members of a trafficking ring that obtained organs from the poor and
sold them for transplants abroad. Their largest market was Brazil. Id.
4' Italy: Denounce Traffic in Peruvian Children, INTER PRESS SERv., May 28, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nsamer Library, Alnsa File. Italian police discovered a network
of traffickers who were kidnapping children from Peru and Brazil, quite possibly to be
used for their organs. Id.
' Body Parts Documentary, supra note 43. According to Bruce Harris, narrator of
the documentary "The Body Parts Business," an Argentinean judge is investigating a
state psychiatric clinic in Montes Dioca where it has been alleged that over 300
comeas have been stolen from the patients living there. Id.; Maria L. Avignolo,
Argentina: Children Robbed of Their Kidneys, REUTER TEXTLINE SUN. TIMES, Dec. 8,
1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File (noting that Julie Cesar Araoz,
the Health Minister of Argentina, reported that several children had been kidnapped,
had an organ removed, and were sent back home with money in their pocket).
' Bowcott, supra note 36 (explaining that "[i]n Brazil, bodies have reportedly
washed up on the beach, their kidneys surgically removed[]").
4' Blair & Kaserman, supra note 17, at 416-17 (noting that "the World Health
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As immunosuppressant drugs have become more effective in their
role of decreasing organ rejection,49 it has become easier to receive the
organ of a stranger. Unfortunately, the medical standards at these "kidney-
marts" are so poor that foreigners are being sent home with disease and
infection." Oman," the United Arab Emirates5 2 Saudi Arabia, 3 Ku-
wait, 4 and Singapore55 have all reported citizens returning home with
Organization is encouraging member countries to outlaw organ sales . . . in part in re-
sponse to undocumented reports that children from Brazil and Honduras were being
sold to organ and tissue traders in other countries who were converting them into
'organ farms'). See also EP Debates Organ Transplants and Blood Transfusions,
REUTER EuR. COMMUNITY REP., Sept. 13, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Reuec File; UN Investigates Traffic of Children's Organs in Latin America, NoTIMEx
MEx. NEWS SERV., Aug. 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Notimx File
(reporting that children are kidnapped and bought as part of illegal traffic in organs
that leads from Latin America into the United States, as well as Israel, Honduras,
Guatemala, Paraguay, Mexico, and Brazil). It has been reported that a baby's kidneys
can sell for £25,000, and its heart for £55,000. William Vanvolsem, Britain Linked to
Baby Smuggling, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Aug. 13, 1993, at 10. But see Linda Feldman,
Soviets Smile, But Fake Stories Continue, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 6, 1988, at
1 (claiming that reports of Latin American children being kidnapped and slaughtered for
their organs by the United States are rumors that are being perpetuated by the Soviet
government); David Schreiberg, Postcard - Mexico: Dead Babies; Persistent Media
Sensationalism Keeping False 'News' Story of American Kidnapping of Mexican Chil-
dren for Organ Piracy, NEw REP., Dec. 24, 1990, at 12.
" See Sharon Begley, Cyclosporine: The Breakthrough Drug, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 29,
1983, at 41.
o Thomson Prentice, Bombay Is Accused Over Kidney Deaths, THE TIMES, Sept. 21,
1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, Times File (stating that "[tihe HIV epidemic
in Bombay is expected to spread wildly since infected people continue to sell blood.
Only 5 percent of the blood is checked for HIV, and the virus can be transmitted by
a kidney graft even when the donor tests negative."). See also Wallace, supra note 26
(reporting that "[o]ne facility in southern China, which performs transplants by day, is
a disco at nightfl").
51 Organ Bazaar, supra note 13 (illustrating that one in fifteen Omanis who re-
ceived an organ transplant abroad contracted the HIV virus, and many have died);
Oswald Pereira, Oman Warning on Kidney Transplants, MIDDLE E. NEWS NETWoRK,
July 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Menn File ("At least five Omani
patients who went abroad for kidney transplants ha[ve] died of surgical complications.").
52 Prentice, supra note 50 ("Twenty-four Arabs who had kidney transplants with
organs they bought from living donors in India died within a year of their operation.").
" Habib Trabelsi, Wealth Corrupts Kidney Health in the Gulf, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Mar. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File ("[Tlhose seeking
[cheaper] Indian kidneys returned with organs taken from people suffering from AIDS,
viral hepatitis, or syphilis.).
14 AIDS Brought to Kuwait From Abroad, ARAB TIMES, Dec. 13, 1992, available
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an organ that was potentially more life-threatening than the one removed.
Note, however, that substandard medical practices also plague intra-state
organ transplantation.56 These lax medical standards are a result of lax
legal standards allowing the sale of transplantable organs between vir-
tually any two individuals who enter the transplantation clinic.
As a result of these various offenses, a number of "problem" coun-
tries where commercial organ sales flourish, as well as many other
countries, have decided to ban the practice. 7 Some of these countries
include the Philippines," Egypt, 9 Hong Kong,' Thailand,", Japan,62
the United Arab Emirates,63 Russia,' Venezuela,65 Singapore,' Ar-
in LEXIS, News Library, Nonus File.
" India "May Ban Trade in Organs by End of Year," STRArrs TIMES, May 1,
1992, at 30 [hereinafter India May Ban].
A Singapore General Hospital study of patients from 1986 to May [1991] showed that
about 150 of the patients who went to India and China returned with serious diseases
and infections such as hepatitis and AIDS. Nine died, and another nine had to have
their kidneys removed because of infection and rejection.
Id.
' See Kidney Transplant Patients Infected With Leukemia Virus, KYoDo NEws
SERV., May 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nonus File (noting that three
Japanese kidney transplant patients from a Hokkaido hospital were infected with a
leukemia virus because of unconfirmed donor blood tests).
5 Fox & SwAZEY, supra note 25, at 68 (reporting that "[b]y 1989 more than 20
countries had instituted political or legal provisions against commerce in organs[]").
"' Bill Banning Selling of Vital Human Organs Submitted, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE,
May 23, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, Jen File.
9 Lucas, supra note 27.
60 Carol Scott, Hong Kong: Organ Traders Face Jail Term, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Mar. 28, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txprim File. See also Com-
mercial Organ Trading Banned in Hong Kong, XINHUA GEN. NEws SERV., Mar. 27,
1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File.
6' Thailand to Ban Organ Trade, XINHUA GEN. OVERSEAS NEWS SERV., June 23,
1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File.
62 Masako Takuma, Brain Death Recommendation Spurs Action, NIKKEI WEEKLY,
May 16, 1992, at 24, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nikkei File; Michael C.
Brannigan, A Chronicle of Organ Transplant Progress in Japan, 5 TRANSPLANT INT'L
180, 182 (1992). After the Act Concerning the Transplantation of Cornea and Kidneys
was passed in Japan in 1979, a modification was passed in March, 1980 prohibiting
organ sales. Id.
Organ Transplant Allowed in UAE, KHALEEJ TIMES, Nov. 19, 1992.
Trading in human organs is prohibited and if it comes to the knowledge of a doctor
that the organ has been obtained through pecuniary considerations, he should not
perform the transplant .... Those violating the law will render themselves liable to
jail terms and a fine not exceeding Dh30,000 or both.
Id.
64 Svetlana Tutorskaya, Henceforth, Donated Organs Cannot be Bought and Sold,
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gentina,67  Uruguay,63  France,69  Canada,70  the United States,7' the
United Kingdom,7 and the European Parliament.73 A number of coun-
CURRENT DIG. OF THE PosT-SOvIET PRESS, Feb. 17, 1993, at 6 (noting that the law
states that if Russian legal norms do not conform to international ones, international
norms will prevail).
' Jack C. Rodriguez, Organ Transplants in Venezuela, 1 INT'L J. MED. & L. 121,
122 (1979) (noting that article 6 of the Law of Transplants in Venezuela, passed in
December, 1970, enumerates the punishments in criminal courts for those "engag[ing]
in commerce with viscera .... .. ); Luis Cordova, Venezuela: Police Case Reveals
Problems in Organ Transplants, INTER PRESS SERV., May 22, 1990, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Inpres File.
6 Human Organ Transplant Act, 1987, pt. IV, §14 (Sing.), reprinted in REPORT OF
THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE HUMAN ORGAN TRANSPLANT BILL [Bill No. 26/86]
[hereinafter Sixth Parliament Report].
(1) Subject to this section, a contract or arrangement under which a person agrees, for
valuable consideration . . . to the sale or supply of any organ or blood from his body
or the body of another person . . . shall be void. (2) A person who enters into a
contract or arrangement of th[is] kind . . . shall be guilty of an offense.
Id.
67 CODIGO PENAL DE LA NACION ARGENTINA [COD. PEN.], Ley 21.541, arL 29, as
amended by Ley 23.464 (Eduardo Carlos Hortel ed., 4th ed. 1989) (Arg.). Anyone
caught selling or who has the intention of selling organs or other anatomical materials
from persons or cadavers will be sentenced to six months to five years in prison. This
law also applies to foreigners, and contains a provision for a harsher sentence if the
individual is a repeat offender. Id.
6' CODIGO PENAL DE LA REPUBLICA ORIENTAL DEL URUGUAY [COD. PEN], Ley
14.005 de 17 Agosto 1971, § 34, art. 14, (Antonio Camafio Rosa ed., 3d ed. 1980)
(Urn.) (indicating that the transfer of organs or tissues for money or other consideration
is punishable by six months to four years in prison, and that it is also illegal to
receive money for the actual transplantation of an organ that has been bought).
' Loi No. 76-1181, 1976 J. OFFICIEL DE LA RtPUBLIQUE FRAN(AISE 7365, art. 3,
reprinted in 1977 RECUEIL DALLOz SIREY: DE DOCTRINE DE JURISPRUDENCE ET DE
LfGISLATION 13 (Without prejudice to the reimbursement of all costs that may occur
due to the removal of an organ done in accordance with law, one may not give the
donor any monetary compensation for the organ.).
70 Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.O., ch. 210, §10 (1980) (Can.), reprinted in Randy
W. Marusyk & Margaret S. Swain, A Question of Property Rights in the Human Body,
21 OTrAWA L. REv. 351, 363 (1989). No person shall buy, sell, or otherwise deal in,
directly or indirectly, for a valuable consideration, any tissue for a transplant, or any
body part or parts thereof other than blood or a blood constituent, for therapeutic
purposes, medical education, or scientific research, and any such dealing is invalid as
being contrary to public policy.
Id.
71 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (1988) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly
acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for
use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.").
72 Human Organ Transplants Act, 1989, ch. 31, §1 (Eng.).
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tries, including Poland,74 India,7 and China,76 are considering banning
or limiting organ sales.' However, the question lingers whether such
bans will be effective in stopping the trade, or whether it will only suc-
ceed in driving it underground.
IV. CURRENT LEGISLATIVE PHILOSOPHIES USED IN THE PROCUREMENT
OF HUMAN ORGANS
A vast range of organ procurement systems has been employed by
different nations, with some states switching from one strategy to another
in the process of searching for the most effective system.78 Typically,
these systems attempt to balance the need to maximize the number of
organs procured, and the restraints that religious, ethical, constitutional,
A person is guilty of an offense if in Great Britain he . . . makes or receives any pay-
ment for the supply of, or for an offer to supply, an organ which has been or is to be
removed from a dead or living person and is intended to be transplanted into another
person whether in Great Britain or elsewhere.
Id.
' The European Parliament adopted two resolutions on September 14, 1993: one
calls for the unpaid donations of blood; while the other calls for a prohibition on the
trading of human organs. Magee, supra note 2, at 2.
7' The Transplant People, THE WARSAW VOtCE, June 20, 1993 (reporting that the
proposed law would make trading and transplanting commercially obtained organs
illegal).
' Organ Bazaar, supra note 13. The Indian Parliament has proposed banning organ
sales because they are unethical, and they will be harmonizing their law with the
World Health Organization. Experts doubt such a ban will occur because of the fear
that all the ban will do is drive kidney sales underground and make them much more
dangerous. Id. See also India May Ban, supra note 55; India Moves Tough, supra note
36; India to Outlaw Trade in Human Organs, XINHUA GEN. NEWS SERv., Nov. 4,
1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Xinhua File.
76 China to Crack Down on Organ Sales for Transplant, REUTER LiBR. REP., Oct.
6, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File.
' The Council of Europe has also issued a recommendation to Member States
urging a prohibition of organ sales. Res. of the Comm. of Ministers, Eur. Consult. Ass.,
Res (78)29, art. 9 (1978), reprinted in Council of Europe, Removal, Grafting and
Transplantation of Human Substances, 1 INT'L J. MED. & L. 385, 387 (1979).
" Sixth Parliament Report, supra note 66, at A7-A10. Singapore decided in 1987
to switch organ procurement strategies from voluntary donations to a presumed consent
system due to the ineffectiveness of the voluntary system, as well as to the success of
the Spanish change from voluntary donations to presumed consent. Id. The Report notes
that "[w]hen [Spain] introduced the [presumed consent] law in 1979 the number of
transplantations was 100. But by 1984, the figure had shot up to 1000." Id. See also
Tan L. Khoon, Organ-Donation Law: A Necessary Transplant?, 7 SING. L. REv. 1
(1986); Iyer, supra note 29.
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and property rights put upon the legislature.79 Some procurement strate-
gies have ulterior motives, such as promoting a sense of community and
volunteerism ° or creating a profit.8 Other states have not acted at all,
creating a legal vacuum and a potential of extreme abuses.82 Though a
state's legislative body may evince a desire to procure as many organs as
possible, while avoiding any restraints upon the procurement rate, legisla-
tive action typically occurs only in response to a particular factual
situation requiring immediate action. In the United States, the National
Organ Transplant Act84 was enacted in 1984 for the dual purposes of
countering a proposal by Dr. H. Barry Jacobs M.D. to establish a broker-
age in human kidneys from healthy, live donors, 5 as well as to firmly
establish that voluntary donations were the method of choice in the
United States. This enactment made the sale of human organs a federal
crime. 6 In England, the Human Organ Transplant Act7 was enacted in
1989 after the revelation of the story of a destitute Turkish citizen who
9 See generally Hansmann, supra note 7 (discussing restraints placed on organ
procurement); Silver, supra note 16, at 694 (discussing the competing interests balanced
by the authors of the 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act).
o Blumstein, supra note 12, at 466.
SI In China, "[c]ircumstancial evidence is accumulating that . the transplant
business [is being turned into] a source of hard currency." Ronald Bailey, Should I Be
Allowed to Buy Your Kidney, FORBES, May 28, 1990, at 365. In the past decade,
eleven thousand people have reportedly been executed with a shot in the head, a
method that is preferred because it maximizes a doctor's chances of harvesting viable
organs from the prisoner's body so they can be transplanted into foreigners. Id. See
also Peking Offers Organ-Transplant Service by Shooting Prisoners, CENT. NEWS
AGENCY, July 5, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cenews File; O'Donnell,
supra note 38. Cuba has also expressed the desire to profit from organ transplantation
to foreigners. Bemd Debusmann, Cuba Hopes to Become International Medical Centre,
REUTER N. EuR. SERV., July 4, 1986, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File.
82 Fox & SWAZEY, supra note 25, at 68.
' Butler, supra note 41, at 201 (noting that a flurry of legislation in the United
States was prompted by the "mere possibility" that organs would be traded).
National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 321 (1988), 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274e, 1395 (1988)).
" Fox & SWAZEY, supra note 25, at 65. Dr. Jacobs was the founder and director
of International Kidney Exchange, Inc. This brokerage company wrote to 7500 hospitals
in the hopes of starting an international market using the purchased kidneys of the dis-
advantaged to sell to Americans. In addition to stirring the United States Congress,
Jacobs' plan also was denounced by The National Kidney Foundation, The Transplan-
tation Society, the American Society of Transplant Physicians, and the American
Society of Transplant Surgeons. Id. See also Note, supra note 14, at 1021-22.
42 U.S.C. § 274e (1988).
87 Human Organ Transplants Act, 1989, ch. 31, §1 (Eng.).
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had traveled to London in order to sell his kidney.88 This act like the
others, also prohibits organ sales. The hasty consideration and passage of
each of these laws has recently been criticized by various commentators
who are urging reconsideration of these laws as well as calling for a
lifting of the ban on organ sales.89 If these, and other countries, decide
to reconsider their laws, they must remember that while organ procure-
ment can be an emotional issue, emotion should not be the controlling
factor; rather, analysis of the best method for reasonably increasing the
number of organs procured must be the guiding principle.
Currently, four types of procurement systems are employed, or have
been given serious consideration, by various countries. While no system
has yet proven itself perfect, each possesses certain advantages and
disadvantages that make it possible to consider one superior to all others.
This section attempts to explore each of these systems and enumerates
their differing characteristics.
A. No Domestic Organ Procurement: Importation of Organs and
Traveling to Other States to Obtain Organs
There are only a few nations that have no organ procurement
strategy, usually because of certain cultural taboos that are so strong that
organ procurement cannot be justified. Japan and Iran are examples of
these countries.' Although Japan has had a donor card system in place
since 1977,91 its Health and Welfare Ministry has only recently proposed
setting up an organ procurement information network.' Strong Buddhist
'" Diana Brahams, Kidneys for Sale: Legislation is Needed, 57 MEDICO-LEGAL J.
73, 74 (1989).
'9 See Prerna M. Khanna, Scarcity of Organs for Transplants Sparks a Move to
Legalize Financial Incentives, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1992, at B1; David Price &
Ronnie MacKay, The Trade in Human Organs, 141 NEW L.J. 1307 (1991).
' The Iranian Parliament recently rejected a bill that would have allowed family
members to voluntarily donate the organs of brain dead donors. See Iran Rejects
Transplant Bill, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 27, 1993, at 12 [hereinafter Iran Rejects]. Al-
though the Ayatollah Khomeni issued a decree in 1986 permitting organ transplantation,
and Iran's present spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as well as Iran's president,
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, also endorsed organ transplantation, the bill was
apparently rejected on religious grounds. See Iran Rejects, supra at 12; Rafsanjani
Encourages Donation of Organs of Dead, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 14, 1993,
available in LEXIS Nexis Library, AFP File.
" Brannigan, supra note 62, at 182. Subsequently, Japan also stipulated that family
consent had to be obtained, and that no particular recipient was needed at the time of
removal. Id.
92 Organ Transplant Info and Liaison Network Launched, REP. FROM JAPAN, Feb.
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and cultural traditions that forbid removal of organs because of a belief
that the corpse must be buried intact,93 coupled with transplant physician
mistrust,9 4 and a refusal to legislatively define death as brain death
instead of cardio-pulmonary death,95 have resulted in a virtual absence of
donor organs in Japan9 6 Japan satisfied kidney demands through Ameri-
can imports through the mid-1980's,97 and continues to import eyes,
corneas, serum, and blood.9" Demand for kidneys and other organs today
is substantially met through travel abroad to reportedly buy or otherwise
obtain organs from donors in India," Sri Lanka,"° the Philippines,''
China,10 2 Australia, 3 and elsewhere.' 4
Recent concern over Japan's "international reputation as a consumer
of body parts that can't be obtained at home,"'0 5 and the fear of "trans-
plant friction" joining "trade friction" is adding to international anger
toward the Japanese over perceived unfaimess."° These factors have
helped prompt probable reform of this system of procurement, by result-
ing in proposals for the establishment of a brain-death law,"7 transplant
3, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Rptjap File.
" Yutaka Sato, A Buddhist Perspective on Transplants, NIKKEi WEEKLY, May 16,
1992, at 24, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Nikkei File. According to Buddhist
tradition, "even the nails or hair of the dead retain connection to the soul ..... Id.
See also Brannigan, supra note 62, at 182, 183.
94 Brannigan, supra note 62, at 182.
' Itaru Oishi, Brain-Death Debate Keeps Organ-Donor Controversy Alive, NIKKEI
WKLY., July 27, 1991, at 2, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Nikkei File.
"' Brannigan, supra note 62, at 182 ("In 1988, 11,895 of the 88,534 chronic dial-
ysis patients were on the waiting list for kidneys from cadavers. Yet the average
number of cadaver kidney transplants in Japan remained under 200 per year.").
' Sam Jameson, Japan in Search of its Heart, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 22, 1992, at Al
(showing that the importation ended when American suppliers balked).
98 Id.
99 Id.
1oo Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
10 Brannigan, supra note 62, at 185 ("By 1987, 22 Japanese had gone to Australia
for liver transplants."); Oishi, supra note 95, at 2; Emiko Terazono, Survey of Japan,
FIN. TIMEs, July 14, 1993, at 14.
"io Brannigan, supra note 62, at 185. Forty children with biliary atresia, a liver dis-
ease, have sought transplants overseas. There has also been media attention given to
Japanese transplants in Canada and London. Id.
105 Id.
" Jameson, supra note 97, at Al.
07 Brannigan, supra note 62, at 185 (noting that by the end of 1990, 47% of the
Japanese generally, and 65% of the professionals, favored brain-death criteria; addition-
PRESUMED DONATIVE CONSENT
hospitals,'0° and a national transplant network center."°n In a world
market that suffers from a lack of a safe and reliable supply, importation
of organs is perhaps the least reliable method of organ procurement."0
B. Voluntary, Non-Pecuniary Donation of Human Organs
Though the precise form may differ across jurisdictions, the principle
behind voluntary donation is that the donor freely gives prior consent to
a medical team to remove the needed organs. By law, no financial
remuneration is allowed for the organ donor, beyond any expenses
incurred in connection with the harvesting of the organ from the do-
nor."' The voluntary donor can be living or dead, though most often it
is a cadaveric donor."2 The motivation behind donation in such a sys-
tem varies: altruism,' " coercion, "14 and moral duty"5 have all been
cited as incentives. The voluntary donor allocation system seeks to avoid
ally, numerous government task forces and commissions are looking into the feasibility
of a brain-death law). See also Diet Panel Urges Organ Transplant Bill, YOMURI NEWS
SERV., May 20, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nonus File (noting that a
Diet panel urged early passage of laws allowing organ transplantation, including a
brain-death law); Japan Moves Toward Allowing Heart Transplants, REUTER LIBRARY
REPORT, Dec. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File (Japan currently
is considering a bill that, while not officially defining brain death as the legal defini-
tion of death, would allow brain-death criteria to be used when considering the removal
of an organ for transplant.).
"0 See Five Hospitals Determined Suitable for Liver Transplants, KYoDO NEWS
SERV., June 14, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Jen File.
"o See Group Calls for National Organ Network, YoMURI NEWS SERV., May 12,
1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nonus File.
11 Another country that has practiced importation as an organ procurement technique
is India, which imports eyes from Sri Lanka. M. Zakaria Siddiqi, Legal Issues in
Human-Organ Transplant: Indian Perspective, 7 IsLAM!c & CoMe. L. Q. 144, 159
(1987). India, however, is not alone. As of 1987, Sri Lanka had exported 19,664 pairs
of eyes to 133 cities in 53 countries. Id.
Cohen, supra note 6, at 12.
,12 Irwin Kleinman & Frederick H. Lowy, Ethical Considerations in Living Organ
Donation and a New Approach: An Advance-Directive Organ Registry, 152 ARCH. IN-
TERN. MED. 1484, 1485 (1992).
"' Ann McIntosh, Regulating the "Gift of Life" - The 1987 Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act, 65 WASH. L. REV. 171, 178 (1990).
"' Kleinman & Lowy, supra note 112, at 1485 (noting that if a close relative's life
is in the balance, donation is probably not "voluntary," but rather, coerced). See also
Note, supra note 14, at 1034.
1,5 See David Peters, A Unified Approach to Organ Donor Recruitment, Organ Pro-
curement, and Distribution, 3 J. L. & HEALTH 157, 167-77 (1990).
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the commercialization of organs on the premise that such an act is
contrary to societal values. 1 6 However, numerous commentators, bol-
stered by public opinion polls,"7 have argued that the public is willing
to accept financial incentives to increase organ procurement. Additionally,
other programs, such as required request, mandated choice, and family
consent are used to further bolster voluntary donations. Such programs
have been implemented in nations that have found the altruistic incentive
that a voluntary system offers is insufficient to meet the demand for
transplantable organs.
1. Voluntary, Inter-Vivos Donations
Donation of a paired organ, such as a kidney, and the donation of
other replenishable bodily products such as blood, plasma, skin, and bone
marrow" 8 are all possible by living donors. Other more unconventional,
albeit possible, donations by living donors are feasible, including eyes,"9
testicles, 2. and parts of livers.' States that allow voluntary donation
by living donors generally limit the potential donors to family members,
on the belief that a non-family member has no real incentive to donate,
and therefore, could actually be selling the organ." States that have not
enacted a brain-death law, yet want to avoid commercialization of organs,
find themselves in the odd position of allowing only voluntary, inter-vivos
donations. Such a procurement strategy results in few organs and, in
effect, encourages human rights violations through organ procurement
practices."z
..6 Note, supra note 14, at 1034.
17 Warren, supra note 1. In a recent poll, 56% of the United States public stated
they would be willing to purchase an organ for a loved one if necessary. Id. Another
poll found that 52% favored some sort of financial compensation for human organs,
while only 22% opposed any compensation. Id.
"8 Siddiqi, supra note 110, at 144-45.
.. Id. at 150 (noting that this practice is generally considered morally and ethically
wrong).
2 Chris Wood et a., The Transplant Revolution, MACLEAN'S, Nov. 23, 1987, at 34,
36. Doctors at the Hubei Medical College in Wuhan, China, transplanted a functioning
testicle from father to son. The recipient has since had a child, who according to
geneticists, is the father's half-brother. Id.
121 Thomas H. Maugh, Liver Transplant Technique Seen Having Impact Overseas,
Posing Ethical Problems, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 30, 1989, at A23.
" Price & MacKay, supra note 89, at 1307 (commenting on the British Human
Organ Transplant Act). Such an attitude, however, ignores the incentives one would
have in donating to a friend.
'23 Genasci, supra note 36. In Brazil, which has no brain-death law, 80% of the
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2. Voluntary, Cadaveric Organ Donations
The cadaveric organ donor can donate at least twenty-five different
body parts and fluids. 24 Most, though not all, of the organs and tissues
that are collected from such an individual must be harvested while the
heart and lungs are still oxygenating the body, despite the fact that the
person is brain dead. Therefore, in order for such a program to work the
country must have a brain-death law, because once the heart dies, the
other organs die as well, and are useless for transplantation. There must
also be some system through which the donor can indicate a willingness
to donate, whether it is through a computer registry, the carrying of an
organ donor card, executed through a will, or is indicated on a driver's
license.
Altruism has been cited as the primary incentive for citizens during
their lives to volunteer to donate their organs after death."z "Proponents
of an altruistic system of organ recovery identify social benefits of the
process of donation. Organ donation affins socially valued human
interactions. The donor's experience in enhancing or saving another's life
brings the social community together."'26 Altruism was the guiding
principle used by lawmakers in the United States in formulating the
National Organ Transplant Act. 27 It was believed that commercial sales
might lead to the collapse of the voluntary organ donor system, and result
in an overall decrease in available organs."
kidneys for transplant come from relatives. The result is that out of 50,000 potential
kidney transplant candidates in Brazil (determined by the World Health Organization),
only 500 received kidney transplants. Id. Additionally, Brazil has been cited numerous
times as a nation where human rights violations occur in connection with organ
procurement.
124 Cohen, supra note 6, at 3. This list of organs available from a cadaveric donor
includes parts of the inner ear, a variety of glands - pancreas, pituitary, thyroid, para-
thyroid, and adrenal - blood vessels, tendons, cartilage, muscles - including the heart
- testicles, ovaries, fallopian tubes, nerves, skin, fat, bone marrow, blood, livers, kid-
neys, comeas. Id. Lungs, fetal brain tissue, plasma, semen, ova, stomachs, small intes-
tines, and eyes can also be added to this list.
" McIntosh, supra note 113, at 178.
126 id.
22 Note, supra note 14, at 1034.
' Id. at 1033. This actually has occurred in Oman, where voluntary organ donations
are virtually non-existent, since those needing an organ - specifically a kidney -
travel to India to purchase one. Organ Bazaar, supra note 13. One Omani transplant
surgeon reported that he had not performed organ transplant surgery in eight months,
3351994]
336 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. [Vol. 26:315
It seems, however, as if "altruism" is a procurement method pre-
ferred by medical professionals 29 and the government, but not the mar-
ket. Generally, the effectiveness of voluntary donation in producing
maximum organ procurement is poor, though exceptions do exist.
30
There has been such a consistent lack of organs procured by such a
system that various laws have been introduced to increase voluntary
donation. One of these laws is the required request law that mandates that
the attendant doctor or nurse ask the next of kin of a viable organ donor
if the patient's organs may be donated.13' The problem with such a
system is that often the physician does not ask the family if they wish to
donate the deceased's organs. 32 Additionally, many doctors still ask for
familial consent even though the deceased carried an organ donor card
which unequivocally gave prior consent.'33 While such a system has had
since there were no organs to transplant. He attributed the organ shortage directly to
the organ sales occurring in India. Id. Relatives of one Omani with end-stage renal
failure refused to donate one of their own kidneys, knowing that there are those in
India who will sell one kidney, and bear the risk of living with only one. Id.
29 Health Care Professionals Oppose Financial Incentives for Organ Donation, PR
Newswire, Apr. 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Prnews File. "[O]rgan
donation will be better off if we keep commercialism out of what should be an act of
good will," according to Dr. Russel H. Patterson, Jr., chief of neurosurgery at the New
York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center. Id.; see also Warren, supra note 1 (noting that
"[a] number of polls of health care professionals have found a significant majority -
60% to 80% - firmly oppose offering payment for donation .... "). It is important
to note, however, that the transplant doctors and nurses, the hospitals, the organ
transport teams, the organ registries, and the drug companies, all receive payment or
government funding.
"3 Ireland, which relies on an informal principle of informed consent of donors and
their next of kin, has the one of the highest number of organ donors in Europe.
Magee, supra note 2, at 2. Although Ireland currently enjoys a procurement rate of 20
donors per million - as compared with the 18 per million in the United States and
15.1 per million in Britain, Trish Hegarty, Reduction in Kidney Transplants Worries
Medical Authorities, IR. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1993, at p. 2, and Austria's 60 per million,
Changes Needed to Get More Kidneys, STRArrs TIMES, May 27, 1992, at L2 -
Ireland's donation rates are leveling off, or possibly even declining. Hegarty, supra note
130, at 2.
131 Cohen, supra note 6, at 21.
,31 John George, Up for Debate: Improving Odds for Those Awaiting Transplants,
PHLA. Bus. J., Dec. 2, 1991, at 1. A recent study has found that routine request laws
were typically being ignored. Among participating hospitals in the Delaware Valley
Transplant Program, it was found that "nearly half of potential organ donors were
overlooked." Id.
133 Wood et al., supra note 120, at 35. One Canadian source noted that "most
doctors honor surviving relatives' decision not to donate their loved one's organs -
PRESUMED DONATIVE CONSENT
the effect of increasing organ donation in the United States, there is still
a vast organ deficit that voluntary donation has not solved.'34
The resulting lack of procured organs has led some commentators to
suggest that an incentive would increase organ donations. The only
proposal which does not involve some sort of financial compensation is
one that would give avowed organ donors priority in receiving organs
should the situation arises in which the subject donor needed transplant
surgery.'35 One objection to such a proposal is that it discriminates
against those who refuse to donate for "valid" religious reasons.'36 An-
other is that it discriminates against the procrastinating donor.'37 Still
another is that it may erode the incentive of pure altruism. 8 Priority
may not be an effective market incentive in the voluntary donation
scheme because of the public's general lack of willingness to consider
their own mortality.'39
There has even been the unique argument made in the United States
that the government's exclusive control over the procurement and distribu-
tion of transplantable organs is a violation of anti-trust laws.Y Since the
government has empowered, through statute, only one agency to procure
and distribute organs, this agency has a monopoly that can stifle any
competition that could result in more efficient operations.'' The fact
that organ procurement and distribution is an admittedly "special" market
should not matter, "since the Supreme Court has rejected arguments that
the special characteristics of a particular industry justify anti-competitive
arrangements on the ground that they 'will better promote trade and
even though the victim . . . may have previously signed the organ-donation form that
accompanies all provincial drivers' licenses." Id.
'"4 See Cohen, supra note 6, at 21-24. Currently, as many as six Americans die
each day waiting for a donor organ. Organ Bazaar, supra note 13.
'~ Kleinman & Lowy, supra note 112, at 1485.
' Peters, supra note 115, at 180-81. Note that many religions, however, have
expressly declared that organ donation is acceptable. William Montalbano, New Vatican
Catechism Updates 1566 Version, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 17, 1992, at Al (according to the
new catechism, "transplanting of organs is acceptable only when the donor consents").
137 Peters, supra note 115, at 180.
' Kleinman & Lowy, supra note 112, at 1487.
"31 Cohen, supra note 6, at 11 (observing "[t]hat eighty percent of Americans die
without a will is suggestive that, even where there are compensating personal benefits,
we are reluctant to come to grips with our own mortality[]").
" See Hawley, supra note 4, at 1111-24.
'41 Id. at 1112 (noting that "[b]y virtue of NOTA, the OPTN [Organ Procurement
Transplantation Network] has a monopoly over national computerized organ procurement
networks, and each OPO [Organ Procurement Organization] has a monopoly over its
individual service area[]").
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commerce than competition.""' 42 Other arguments that have been made
against voluntary donation address the property rights43 and privacy
rights'" a donor may have in his organs and tissues. The common law
tradition in the United States, however, has been that the donor may
have, at best, a quasi-property interest in the disposition of his body once
he has died. 45 All of these arguments are equally applicable in the next
system of organ procurement - presumed consent.
C. Presumed Consent or Opting-Out
Presumed consent is one of the more frequently employed methods
of organ procurement in Europe, among other places in the world."
This system has even enjoyed limited success in the United States with
respect to procuring cornea transplants. 47 Under a presumed consent
system, the state adopts the presumption that the donor wishes to donate
organs, unless it was indicated otherwise during life.'" France, for
example, enacted an organ procurement statute employing presumed
consent in 1976.' Known as the Caillavaet Law, a person may "opt-
142 Blumstein, supra note 12, at 491 (quoting National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)). However, Blumstein notes that "[i]t is
possible to argue . . .that the antitrust laws should not apply to the conduct of UNOS
and the OPTN. Any claim of immunity ... must come from either an express
statutory exemption or an implied or inferred immunity." Id. at 493.
143 Cohen, supra note 6, at 19.
"44 Karen L. Johnson, The Sale of Human Organs: Implicating a Privacy Right, 21
VAL. U. L. REV. 741, 754 (1987) (noting that "an individual's right to choose to sell
an organ . . .should be accorded constitutional protection, and the government should
not unnecessarily interfere with the individual's exercise of that right[]"). See also Note,
supra note 14, at 1025.
,"' Silver, supra note 16, at 690-91.
46 ONTARIO MINISTRY OF HEALTH, ORGAN DONATION IN THE EIGHTIES: THE
MINISTER'S TASK FORCE ON KIDNEY DONATION 40 (1986) ("Presumed consent has
been initiated in at least seventeen countries (largely in Europe) ...."); William N.
Gerson, Refining the Law of Organ Donation: Lessons from the French Law of
Presumed Consent, 19 INT'L L. & POL. 1013, 1019 (1987); Khoon, supra note 78, at
8.
147 See State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986); Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc.
v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1985) (holding that a statute giving the coroner the
presumed consent of the donor to remove the deceased's corneas without family inquiry
is constitutional); Gerson, supra note 146, at 1019-20. But see Brotherton v. Cleveland,
923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a coroner violated due process by taking
the deceased's corneas during an autopsy without family consent and deprived the
plaintiff, the deceased's wife, of property rights in her dead husband's body).
'4 Cohen, supra note 6, at 15.
, Loi No. 76-1181, 1976 J. OFFICIEL DE LA RtPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE 7365, art. 2,
[Vol. 26:315
PRESUMED DONATIVE CONSENT 339
out" from donating organs simply by signing a writing to that effect.50
Singapore recently passed a variation of the standard opt-out law.' The
Singapore law includes a specific religious exemption for Muslims,'52
who must "opt-in" to the organ donation program in order to have the
same priority in receiving an organ as those who are presumed to consent
to organ donation.' Muslims were forbidden by Islamic law to donate
organs when the law passed in 1987,154 but a subsequent Fatwa, or reli-
gious decree, has found organ donation - though not organ sales - to
be acceptable, as long as the organ is used for transplantation purpos-
es.' An educational drive was recently mounted in Singapore which
reprinted in 1977 RECUEIL DALLOZ SIREY: DE DOCTRINE DE JURISPRUDENCE ET DE
LGIsLATION 13 (stating that the removal may be done for scientific or therapeutic
reasons on the cadaver of a person who did not make known during his life his refusal
of the removal. However, if the cadaver in question is a minor or an incompetent, the
removal for transplantation purposes is not possible without the consent of that person's
legal representative); Gerson, supra note 146, at 1022.
's Gerson, supra note 146, at 1022-23.
' Sixth Parliament Report, supra note 66, pt. II, § 5.
(1) The designated officer of a hospital may, subject to and in accordance with this sec-
tion, authorise, in writing, the removal of any organ from the body of a person who
has died in the hospital for the purpose of the transplantation of the organ to the body
of a living person . . . . (2) [Unless] (a) [the person] has during his lifetime registered
his objection with the Director to the removal of the organ from his body after death.
Id.
Id. ("No authority shall be given under subsection (1) for the removal of the
organ from the body of any deceased person ...who is a Muslim."); Iyer, supra note
29, at 135.
'53 Sixth Parliament Report, supra note 66, pt. In, § 12.
(2)(a) a person referred to in section 5 (2)(g) shall have priority over a person who has
registered such objection only if he has made a gift of his organ, to take effect upon
his death ... (b) . . . [and] shall have the same priority as a person [who has not
registered an objection].
Id.; Iyer, supra note 29, at 135. Previously, however, non-consenting Muslims were
given the same priority as other consenting Singaporeans for receipt of dialysis treat-
ment. The Singapore National Kidney Foundation, however, changed their policy, giving
non-consenting Muslims the same priority on dialysis machines as others who have
opted-out of the donor system, since the Muslims were unfairly benefiting from the law
at the expense of non-consenting non-Muslims, as well as consenting non-Muslims.
Mardiana Abu Bakar, NKF: "Our Resources Are Being Drained," STRAITS TIMES, Sept.
23, 1993, at 5. This policy was passed in hopes of inspiring Singapore's Muslims to
opt-in to the donation system. Mardiana Abu Bakar, NKF's New Move "Tough But
Fair," STRArrs TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at 5.
'5 See generally Iyer, supra note 29, at 135 (discussing the proposed law).
'5 Sixth Parliament Report, supra note 66, at A6.
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resulted in Muslim kidney pledges (kidney donations increased by sixty-
seven percent)." 6
Presumed consent, when strictly followed by the state, has proven to
be the best practiced method of maximizing organ procurement.'57 For
example, in Austria, sixty cadaveric kidneys are retrieved for every one
million persons, a rate that is twice that of the United States and most
other European countries.'58 Some commentators have actually suggested
that this system is working too well, and that some surgeons have lost
their sense of discrimination as to who should and should not receive
kidney transplants.'59 While some may believe this is a valid objection,
it is currently without merit given the dearth of procured organs world-
wide. Even among presumed consent states, there remains a deficit of
procured organs, though often it is because the procurement system is
being improperly administered by health care professionals."W Despite a
The object of transplanting a kidney from the body of a deceased Muslim to that of a
donee is primarily and exclusively to save life. On no account can a kidney be allowed
to be removed from the body of a Muslim for other purposes such as carrying out
medical research, advancement of medical science, etc.
Id. (quoting letter from Ridzwan Hj Dzafir, President of the Majlis Ugama Islam
Singapore, to the Select Committee). See also Furqan Ahmad, Organ Transplant in
Islamic Law, 7 ISLAMIC & CoMp. L. Q. 132 (1987) (discussing how the principle of
"dire necessity" in Islamic law validates all forms of organ transplant). This overturned
an earlier fatwa made in 1974, that declared organ donation to be forbidden. Mardiana
Abu Bakar, Include Muslims in Organ Transplant Act, STRAITS TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993,
at L4. The reason given for the turnaround is darurat, or crisis situation. Id.
156 Muslims "Now More Aware of Kidney Plight," STRAITS TIMES, Sept. 8, 1992, at
25. Out of 1000 Muslims that pledged kidneys, 400 pledged during a month-long
awareness program. However, this number is inconsequential when compared to the
250,000 Muslims that live in Singapore. Id. As of September, 1993, 1300 Muslims had
opted into the donation system. Bakar, supra note 155.
157 LAMB, supra note 21, at 147 ("If the sole criterion is a policy that will
maximize the number of organs under the most efficient methods, then contracting out
is the most satisfactory strategy .... "); MEYERS, supra note 16, at 192. It has been
argued that legislation to date has not been adequate to provide the organs needed for
transplantation. A statute creating a presumption of intent to donate organs after death,
that would control in the absence of direct evidence to the contrary, would undoubtedly
be more effective in producing a supply of organs. Id.
159 Changes Needed to Get More Kidneys, STRAITS TIMES, May 27, 1992, at 2. This
number is also three times better than the procurement rate in Singapore, id., though
this may be because Muslims are automatically exempt by law from having their
organs procured. See Sixth Parliament Report, supra note 66, pt. I, § 5.
' James Le Fanu, Gifts of Life Cannot be Left to Chance, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH,
July 19, 1992, at 108.
t" ONTARIO MINISTRY OF HEALTH, supra note 146, at 40.
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presumed consent law, there is still a waiting list for organs in
France.161 One reason is that French doctors, in an effort to avoid
administrative problems, ask for familial consent to harvest the organs,
even though, legally, the family has no interest in the disposition of the
deceased's organs.62 Poland has also encountered similar problems of
non-consenting families accusing surgeons of illegally appropriating or-
gans, even though Polish law presumes consent." However, some coun-
tries which have laws based on presumed consent such as Finland,
Greece, Italy, Norway, Spain, and Sweden, also insist that physicians
consult with the deceased's relatives.'"
Still, presumed consent countries such as France, Belgium, and
Austria have higher procurement rates than altruistic systems such as the
one existing in the United States. Therefore, it is not surprising that
seventy-eight percent of transplant surgeons in the United States were in
favor of adopting a presumed consent system." Other countries, like
Israel, are finding that their poor organ retrieval numbers are not only
Presumed consent has been initiated in at least 17 countries (largely in Europe) but
without evidence of increased organ retrieval. This should not be taken as proof that
presumed consent is an ineffective method . . . . [Tihe most significant block may be
professional and, until it is removed, one will not know what impact presumed consent
may have.
Id.
:62 Gerson, supra note 146, at 1024-25 (noting that "[iln 1984 there were nearly a
thousand kidney transplants performed in France, but almost three thousand people
remained on the waiting list[]").
62 Id. at 1025-27 (stating that physicians "are dissuaded by bureaucratic requirements
and are unsure of their legal footing[]"); Greg Del Bigio, Recorded Consideration: A
Policy for Organ Procurement, 9 HEALTH L. CAN. 67, 70 (1989) ("[D]espite legislation
enabling them to do so, French physicians were not willing to remove organs from a
cadaver without the consent of family members.").
263 Krzysztof Grzegrzolka, Organ Transplants: Moral Dilemma, WARSAW VOICE,
Nov. 24, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wrsawv File. Organ procurement
in Poland is done under a 1929 ordinance that was last reviewed in 1949. Id. "The
surgeons' work is made even more difficult because Polish society is not familiar with
this method of treatment and does not fully accept it." Id.
A Polish law is currently under consideration that would re-affirm Poland's use of
presumed consent, as well as outlawing organ sales. The Transplant People, WARSAW
VOICE, June 20, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wrsawv File.
164 LAMB, supra note 21, at 141. Compare this, however, to Austria, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, France, Israel, Poland, and Switzerland, where "physicians may
proceed without asking the next of kin, unless a prior objection has been raised by the
family of the deceased." Id.
'65 Warren, supra note 1.
'66 Id.
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lowering transplantation domestically, but are resulting in their exclusion
from international procurement agencies.'67 Such countries are being
urged to adopt a law of presumed consent. 61 In addition, transnational
bodies like the Council of Europe have recommended that Member States
adopt a system of presumed consent, 69 recognizing the "invaluable im-
portance of substances for transplantation, the shortage of substances
available, and the interests of sick persons."'7° To date, thirteen of the
twenty-one Member States of the Council of Europe have enacted pre-
sumed consent legislation.'7'
Even though, when properly applied, presumed consent has proven
to be a highly efficient means of procuring organs,' many jurisdictions
have rejected presumed consent'73 in favor of other procurement meth-
ods preserving the legal right of the individual to make decisions con-
cerning the disposition of the body.'74 Specifically, such critics argue
,67 Siegel, supra note 27. "French health authorities recently barred all their hospitals
from performing organ transplants on Israelis. Britain is expected to be the next to
establish such a ban, and all the rest of the European Community will follow suit
within two years." Id. This is due to Israel's lack of organ contribution in the
Eurotransplant organ network agency. Id.; see also Judy Siegel, Israel, Cyprus Sign
Accord on Transplants, JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 17, 1993, at 3. Israelis join Italians in
being banned from receiving organ transplants in France. Siegel, supra note 27. See
also, Siegel, supra note 167 (noting that under the terms of a medical accord between
Cyprus and Israel, Cyprus will send organs to Israel, while Israel will reciprocate by
teaching Cypriot surgeons how to perform organ transplants).
"6 Siegel, supra note 27. One Hadassah doctor urges that Israel adopt a law that
proclaims cadaveric organs to be a national resource, removable by the state absent an
opting-out during the donor's life. Id.
69 Res. of the Comm. of Ministers, supra note 77, art. 9.
,70 Council of Europe, Removal, Grafting and Transplantation of Human Substances,
1 INT'L J. MED. & L. 385, 400 (1979). The Council also stressed the article 10 be
considered a "long term aim." Id.
17, LAMB, supra note 21, at 141.
,7 Kenneth M. Norrie, Human Tissue Transplants: Legal Liability in Different Ju-
risdictions, 34 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 442, 461 (1985).
There is no doubt that the approach favoured [sic] by these European countries,
[presumed consent], is the most suitable one for the purposes of health care in general,
because it is the solution which provides the largest number of organs for transplanta-
tions in societies where voluntary donation is wholly inadequate to provide sufficient
numbers to satisfy demand.
Id.
173 Kinkel Seeks Stronger Laws on Organ Transplants, THE WEEK IN GERMANY,
June 14, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wkgerm File [hereinafter Stronger
Laws] (noting that Germany has recently rejected presumed consent, as well as
commercialization of human organs, in favor of voluntary donation).
,' Cohen, supra note 6, at 16 (suggesting that "escheatage seeks to diminish a
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that presumed consent will "lead to a situation where the poor, the
uneducated, and the legally disenfranchised might bear a disadvantageous
burden, and only the more advantaged groups would exercise
autonomy," 75 since only the more advantaged groups would be aware
of their right to opt-out.'76 Other critics fault presumed consent with
eliminating the societal benefits inherent in the charitable act of actively
donating an organ.' r Another concern centers on the legal objections
family members may try to raise, as they have in France, Poland,' and
the United States.'79 Presumed consent is also disfavored because the
procrastinating or reluctant dissenter may not be able to properly exercise
his right to opt-out.'80 There is also a concern that an individual who
has properly opted-out may accidentally have his organs removed. Some
are even concerned that physicians would become less attentive to es-
person's property rights in his own body[]"); Johnson, supra note 144, at 755 (empha-
sizing that "[t]he decision to have an organ removed for transplant . . . involves a fun-
damental right since it concerns one's personal health and the integrity of one's
bodyf").
S LAMB, supra note 21, at 142.
176 Del Bigio, supra note 162, at 70 ("Unless it could be ensured that all persons
would be appropriately educated with respect to organ donation, the system of opting-
out cannot meet the condition of autonomy." (emphasis in original)).
" LAMB, supra note 21, at 141 ("If organ donation is one of the supreme gifts that
one individual can bestow on another, it is argued, society cannot afford to lose such
altruistic practices, the benefits of which spread further than the demand for more
transplantable organs.").
'"' Warren, supra note 1 ("Many experts fear that adopting presumed consent will
lead to a plethora of lawsuits challenging the system's right to remove organs and
tissues without family consent.").
"7 See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
removal of a cornea by the coroner without actual consent is unconstitutional). Note
that many states in the United States do have a presumed consent law for the procure-
ment of corneas, and other states are considering limited presumed consent laws for
other organs. See Legislature Briefs, HOUSTON CHRON., May 25, 1993, at 14 (stating
that Texas has proposed a law that allows for removal of a cadaver's organs if the
body is unclaimed for four hours); Ed Davis & Sandy Hamm, Legislators Ponder Law
to Claim Body Organs, NEw PITTSBURGH COURIER, July 14, 1993, at Al (relating a
proposed Pennsylvania law allowing for presumed consent to donation unless the
deceased had opted-out).
" Silver, supra note 16, at 706 (arguing that "[piresumed consent, however,
insidiously exploits the citizen's regrettable reluctance to dissent, even though dissent
is her right . . . [and that] [e]xploitation of one's reluctance to assert her rights is not
a sound basis for social policyfl").
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tablishing that a donor was truly brain dead prior to removal."' These
concerns will be addressed and countered in Section VI.
A final variation on presumed consent is one that does not allow any
opting-out at all. This has also been called an organ draft or conscription
- similar to a military draft.' Such a law would most easily be ac-
complished by nationalizing cadavers, 83 similar to the way many other
potentially commercial goods and industries are nationalized. Such an
approach, however, would present serious legal problems in many West-
ern countries, as well as potential ethical and political problems in most
other countries worldwide.
D. Organ Trade and Sales
Legal organ sales are perhaps the most controversial of all the
proposed organ procurement systems. As with presumed consent, there are
numerous variations of the legalized organ sale, from live organ broker-
age'84 and organ futures markets' to an income tax deduction'86 or
health insurance reduction incentive.'87 Organ sales are premised on the
legal assumption that an individual has a property right in the body, both
during life and after death.'88 Because this private property right exists,
it is illegal for the government to limit this right by prohibiting organ
sales either through a presumed consent system or a voluntary donation
system. 9 Commentators who support organ sales as a method of organ
procurement further bolster their argument by claiming that financial re-
muneration would provide the needed incentive to donate organs and
reduce the organ deficit in the domestic market.'" Hypothetically, a
well-regulated commercial market provides the incentive for the procrasti-
nating donor, the donor who does not wish to contemplate death, 9' and
' Butler, supra note 41, at 204.
182 For further discussion see id.
183 Liz Hunt, State "Should Have Rights to Organs," INDEPENDENT, Nov. 2, 1992,
at 7.
184 Note, supra note 14, at 1020-22; Edlund, supra note 35.
.85 Cohen, supra note 6, at 32-36.
186 Lindsey Gruson, Signs of Traffic in Cadavers Seen, Raising Ethical Issues, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 1986, at A14.
187 Hansmann, supra note 7, at 63-65.
188 Cohen, supra note 6, at 19.
189 See Hansmann, supra note 7. See also Johnson, supra note 144.
190 Cohen, supra note 6, at 34; Hawley, supra note 4, at 1127 (stating that "[tihe
sale of organs potentially could increase the number of donor organs procured because
the profit motive is generally regarded as stronger than altruism[]").
,', Cohen, supra note 6, at 10-11.
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gives hospital personnel an incentive to determine if a possible candidate
for organ donation is in fact an organ donor.'92
Unfortunately, no well-regulated commercial market for human
organs currently exists; those countries where organ sales are legal. 3 are
among the worst violators of human rights and the exploitation of the
poor. This should not be seen as a problem with the particular commer-
cial system, but as a problem endemic to the nations which procure
organs in such a manner. In fact, some proponents of a commercial organ
market argue that such a system would eliminate the black market.'9 4
The reasons most often cited for the prohibition of organ sales are ethical,
moral, and are not based on empirical evidence.'95 For instance, there is
a significant concern that the sale of organs will cheapen life, analogizing
such a practice to selling one's self into slavery. 6 Others argue that
potential sellers have no right to sell what does not belong to them. 97
A few even believe that human organs fall into the category of something
that cannot be sold.'98 However, many commentators argue that "ethical"
" Id. at 34 (suggesting that "a cause of action for negligence should be established
on behalf of the estate and/or the organ purchasing agency against the hospital for the
financial value . . . " of not procuring the organs of someone who has already signed
a contract to sell them).
"' Or, more appropriately, where organ sales are not considered illegal due to the
absence of any legal regulations.
'94 Richard M. Boyce, Organ Transplantation Crisis: Should the Deficit be Elim-
inated Through Inter-Vivos Sales?, 17 AKRON L. REv. 283, 300 (1983) ("By making
organ sales legal the state would prevent a black market from developing.").
195 Some commentators try to analogize the failure of a commercialized blood bank
to the proposal for commercialized organ sales. But see Hansmann, supra note 7, at 68
(arguing that most prohibitions on organ sales are non-empirical).
" Cohen, supra note 6, at 26-29. Cohen argues that it is perfectly legal for people
to participate in other degrading, dangerous, and unpleasant, yet perfectly legal things,
like boxing, coal mining, cleaning toilets, etc. Id. at 29. However, he makes a better
argument that certain organ sales, like cadaveric organ sales, are distinguishable from
indentured servitude since (1) they occur after natural death, and (2) they are an ex-
pression of personal autonomy, rather than desperate poverty. Id. at 28 n.90.
" Accepting that a person has a private property interest in his/her body rather than
a collective or communal one, this argument fails due to the donor's inalienable right
to dispose of his/her property as he/she pleases. The deceased is already legally
empowered to dispose of his/her other property through a will, as well as designate the
manner in which he/she wishes to be buried. The only situation where this argument
succeeds is in addressing the right of the next of kin to sell the deceased's organs. See
id. at 26-27.
'" This theory seems to attach a mystical or spiritual importance to human organs.
Organs are already exchanged everyday without any financial compensation for the
donor, although it is expected that the donor receives a psychic benefit. Id. at 27. It
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objections such as these must be viewed as anachronistic and damaging
to the goal of maximizing organ procurement. 99
1. Inter-Vivos Sales
Inter-vivos sales are relied upon primarily in countries where there
is no brain-death law,2" or where there are insufficient preservation
techniques to maintain the organ after it has been removed from the
cadaveric donor.2"' However, there are only a few organs that can be
removed from a living donor without committing murder. 2 There are
few countries that admit to participating in the legal trade of living
donors' organs," 3 though those that do generally enjoy an increasingly
brisk business.. 4 through sales to state citizens, as well as to foreigners.
Aside from the obvious potential for human rights violations, such as
illegal trading and murdering for organs, the overwhelming fault of these
systems is that they exploit the poor.0 5 In fact, most of the states that
might be more appropriate to say that human organs cannot have a price put on them,
which may be true, since they are a rather new commodity whose cost cannot easily
be quantified. This does not mean we cannot assign a dollar value to them; we assign
dollar values to similar intangibles everyday, such as the award for pain and suffering
in a tort suit. It just means that the organ market has not yet had an opportunity to
determine a price.
'9 Blair & Kaserman, supra note 17, at 443-50.
0 For Poor Indians, Sale of Kidney Can be Price of Survival: Organ Trade Raises
Ethical Questions, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 28, 1991, at C4 [hereinafter Poor
Indians]. "India still operates under an early 19th century law that makes the removal
of organs from brain-dead patients a crime, preventing creation of a Westem-type
cadaver donor system." Id. Instead, Indian "law has regarded death as the 'apparent
extinction of life as manifested by absence of heart beat and respiration."' Siddiqi,
supra note 110, at 154 (quoting DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (24th
ed., 1965)).
20" Chris Hedges, Egyptian Doctors Limit Kidney Transplants, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
1992, at A5 (explaining that the lack of organ bank facilities necessitates that the
patient and the donor undergo the operation together); Siddiqi, supra note 110, at 146.
202 Tissue, corneas, kidneys, and possibly half of a liver, can be removed from a
living donor and allow that donor to continue living.
203 George, supra note 132 (noting that "[k]idneys . . . are bought and sold in India,
Egypt, and Iraq ...... ).
2' Fox & SwAzEY, supra note 25, at 68 (noting that India "led the world market
in buying and selling kidneys from unrelated living 'donors,' growing from an estimat-
ed 50 such transactions in 1983 to more than 2,000 in 1990[]"); Hedges, supra note
201.
' India Moves Tough, supra note 36 (noting that "organ buyers daily scour the
slums of major cities preying on the poor[]"). "In India as in other countries, the
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have banned commercial organ sales have done so due to the potential
abuses resulting from organ sales by the poor.'e These states assume,
and probably correctly so, that the only person who would respond to a
financial incentive to sell an organ during their life would be destitute.
Why else would an otherwise rational person part with a kidney, unless
the person was in a desperate situation?'
Proponents of inter-vivos sales, however, claim that these are West-
ern attitudes that do not always apply in other countries." 8 These com-
mentators believe that a ban on inter-vivos sales would only drive the
sale underground, and subject it to many more abuses than already
occur .' The answer, they say, is regulation and explicit legalization of
living donor sales is necessary to avoid any more potential human rights
abuses."0
2. Cadaveric Organ Sales
donors are often poor, sometimes sick and invariably in need of the money. The pa-
tients are predominantly affluent, with many coming from the Middle East and ...
Europe." Sanjoy Hazarika, India Debates Ethics of Buying Transplant Kidneys, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1992, at A20. But see Michelle Tan, Kidneys: Buy or Die, STRArrs
TIMES, May 13, 1992, at L3 (giving testimony of a patient whose purchase of a kidney
in India not only saved his life, but substantially bettered the life of the man from
whom he purchased the kidney).
' German Minister of Justice Klaus Kinkel rejected legalizing organ sales, stating
that "unscrupulous profiteers are increasingly attempting to use poor people, especially
from the Third World, as living warehouses for the wealthy in the western industrial
nations." Stronger Laws, supra note 173 (quoting Minister of Justice Klaus Kinkel).
As noted by Leon Schwartzberger, a Socialist French Surgeon who recently
convinced the European Parliament to outlaw organ trading:
Under such a system, a rich and healthy person would not sell one of his kidneys.
There would be a tendency for the pool of donors to be confined to under-privileged
sections of society. It is reasonable to forecast that those who will be prepared to sell
one of their kidneys will be precisely those whose health is most likely to suffer as a
result.
Magee, supra note 2, at 2 (quoting Dr. Leon Schwartzberger).
Poor Indians, supra note 200. "India, which possesses a proud, non-Western cul-
ture, should not be tailoring its national medical policy to U.S. or European standards."
Id. In fact, this same commentator believes that India might be trailblazing for the
West in this area. Id.
Hazarika, supra note 205 ("Doctors in New Delhi and Bombay said a ban on
transplants from living donors would not work, driving the practice underground and
leaving patients at the mercy of agents."). See also Organ Bazaar, supra note 13.
2' Organ Bazaar, supra note 13.
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Officially, this method of organ procurement is not practiced by any
nation, though certain aspects of it have been surreptitiously employed in
the past,2 1' as well as openly attempted quite recently.2"2 The premise
behind such a system is a contract, made between the organ procurement
agency l3 and the potential organ donor during the donor's life. The
contract includes some sort of financial consideration for the right to
remove the organ if the donor dies in such circumstances so as to make
donation possible.2 4 The agency then sells the organ to a desparate
patient. In order to create a true incentive to enter such a program, it is
best if the organ procurement agency rewards the donor financially for
merely signing up, and not make remuneration contingent upon actual
organ harvesting.2"5 The reasons for this are two-fold: first, it helps
create a binding contract that hospital officials must honor or, if they do
not, they can find themselves subject to a law suit by the procurement
agency; second, it produces a true incentive to the donor to enlist.26
21 See Kidney Team Found Favoring Foreigners, Cl-. TRIB., May 16, 1985, at 9
(noting that foreigners were allowed to purchase a better position on the waiting list).
See also Don Colbum, Gov. Casey's Quick Double Transplant: How Did He Jump to
the Top of the Waiting List?, WASH. POST, June 22, 1993, at 28 (examining Pennsylva-
nia Governor Robert Casey's ability to procure a heart and liver for transplant in less
than 24 hours, while the average wait is 198 days for a heart, and 67 days for a
liver).
212 See Scott Shepard, Diamond Aims to Spark National Debate on Organ Procure-
ment Issue, MEMPHIS Bus. J., Aug. 16, 1993, at 14. Two Memphis men have entered
a contract for sale of one of the men's organs upon his death, in the hopes of
challenging the U.S. law prohibiting organ sales. The two men hope to establish a
market for cadaveric organs as commodities to be sold by honest brokers, and claim
to have a list of 50 members so far. The founder, David Diamond, claims that such
a system is preferable for many reasons: it encourages quality; it avoids making diffi-
cult decisions at difficult times; it will increase the number of procured organs; it will
discourage a black market in organs; and it will give the donor personal control over
the decision to donate. Id. See also Monique Beaudin, Quebec Puts Up Cash to
Encourage Organ Donations, THE GAZErrE (Montreal), Dec. 10, 1992, at A6. A
provincial organ donation agency is using a $1.75 million provincial grant to increase
organ donations by paying hospitals $500 for identifying potential donors, and $4500
for harvested organs that are suitable for transplant. Id.
2,3 For the sake of argument, we will assume the procurement agency to be the
state, even though this is not necessary, and for certain reasons, may not be preferred.
See generally Hawley, supra note 4.
214 Cohen, supra note 6, at 33.
25 For an argument against this type of contract and for one that only offers
payment for actual organs harvested, see id. at 33-34.
216 Boyce, supra note 194, at 296 ("Although a financial incentive may entice
someone into a post-mortem organ transfer contract, the lack of immediate payment
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The other commonly proposed alternative is a system that pays money to
the donor's estate or pays for burial costs.217 While these are both
strong incentives, they do not directly benefit the donor, but rather his
next of kin. Since the donor receives no direct benefit, such incentives
may prove insufficient and ineffective as an organ procurement maximiz-
er. However, all one needs to do is look at the millions of dollars spent
annually on life insurance to see that people do not need an immediate
personal benefit to inspire them to prepare for their death.
Whatever form payment takes, there are a number of advantages that
cadaveric organ sales have over others. The first two have been previous-
ly mentioned - the respect for personal autonomy and privacy rights,
and the increased incentive to donate created by compensation. Cadaveric
organ sales have additional advantages over inter-vivos organ sales in that
they do not exploit the poor,"8 and can be entered into solely by the
donor, thereby avoiding the possible human rights abuses committed by
third parties.
However, in countries where no brain-death law exists, cadaveric
organ sales are virtually impossible because organs must be retrieved
while the blood is still oxygenating them. Otherwise, the organs would
deteriorate and be of no use. In countries where the hospital facilities are
not as numerous or advanced as in the United States, there is less of a
chance that the organ can be procured from the cadaver, preserved, and
sent to the recipient before the organ dies. Even in the United States and
other developed countries, there are logistical problems posed by such a
contract. One commentator asks if organ sellers, in order to meet their
organ contracts, will:
be required to keep the organ buyers on notice as to their whereabouts,
or will the contract specifically restrict the seller's freedom of movement
to a designated geographical area? If the performance of the contract is
blocked by a logistical problem, will the seller's estate be liable in
damages, or will the defenses of impossibility and frustration be avail-
able?
Other problems have been pointed out, such as the quality or mer-
chantability of the organs. A products liability suit may lie against a
seller whose organ is defective .... [D]oes the contract imply that the
seller will maintain the organ in merchantable condition by abstaining
may give rise to the same problem from which [voluntary donation systems] suffers -
apathy.").
237 See generally Peters, supra note 5.
2 A wealthy person would have almost as much incentive to receive compensation
for cadaveric organ donations due to the lack of substantial sacrifice on his or her part.
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from alcohol, drugs, and other harmful substances? Will the contract
expressly set out a lifestyle for the seller, deviation from which could
give rise to an action in partial breach?" 9
Further, critics of cadaveric organ sales are concerned that a market
in human organs would lead to a decrease in the number of organs
donated, and an overall increase in the cost of organ transplantation
operations and research.2' There is also a worry that such a system
would bring lower-quality organs.22' The biggest problem confronting
any type of organ sale is deciding if the seller has any legally recogniz-
able property interest in the organ. At common law, there is no true
property interest in a cadaver; rather, the next of kin have a quasi-proper-
ty interest which allows them to have custody and possession of the body
for the purposes of burial or disposal. 2 The body is considered held in
trust by those with an interest, subject to the protection of the public.'
This principle was recently reaffirmed in Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v.
Lavant,"2  State v. Powell,2' and Brotherton v. Cleveland,' noting
that traditional English and American common law gives a quasi-property
interest to the surviving kin in the decedent's body, limited to the burial
or other lawful disposition of the cadaver. 7
Other organ market proposals which on their face appear to be
excellent ideas, are in fact, also subject to certain problems. For instance,
one commentator proposed that a health insurance deduction be made
available to those who pledge their organs.' One problem with this
219 Boyce, supra note 194, at 296-97.
220 Randy W. Marusyk & Margaret S. Swain, A Question of Property Rights in the
Human Body, 21 OTrAWA L. REv. 351, 373 (1989) ("The advancement of scientific
medical research absolutely depends on the availability and free exchange of experimen-
tal tissue, especially in the non-profit university research community.").
22, Id. at 373 ("Furthermore, the pressure of demand will often result in a drop in
the quality of the substance available. Persons wanting to sell tissue for financial gain
may cover up facts regarding their lifestyle in order to qualify."). But see Blair &
Kaserman, supra note 17, at 442-43.
222 Marusyk & Swain, supra note 220, at 360-61.
223 MEYERS, supra note 16, at 183.
224 355 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1985).
22 497 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 1986).
226 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991).
27 Id. at 481. However, the court did go on to find a "substantial interest," amount-
ing to a "legitimate claim of entitlement," existed under the due process clause of the
14th Amendment, seemingly due to the body's increased pecuniary value as a result of
biotechnology advances. Id. at 481-82.
220 Hansmann, supra note 7, at 63-65. Hansmann proposes a plan where insurers
would offer a reduction in health insurance premiums to those who pledged their
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plan is that not every nation has a strong private health insurance system
like the ones in the United States. This severely limits the number of
potential donors to those who have insurance. Second, nations that have
a public health insurance plan, like Canada, offer no financial incentive
for donation, since there can be no reduction in health insurance premi-
ums. Thus, a regulated cadaver organ sale program could work in some
Western industrialized countries, but may not be as practical in other
parts of the world.
The biggest problem with cadaveric organ sales, as evidenced by all
the nations that have outlawed organ sales,229 is that organ sales are not
palatable to the general public, government, or health professionals."0
Still, this practice continues, virtually unchecked in some countries. If
these countries are unable, or unwilling, to halt the organ trade flowing
through their country and into others, then states need a way that they
can legally prosecute, and hopefully eliminate, such a crime. Section V
explores how international principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction may
offer a solution.
V. EXTRATERRITORJAL JURISDICTION
Extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction is the application of one state's
laws within another state. ' Normally, such actions are a violation of
organs for donation. The reduction, albeit a nominal one of roughly $10 per year, is
believed to be enough of an incentive to increase donations. Additionally, Hansmann
says that the option would automatically renew itself yearly unless the donor changed
his/her mind and decided not to be a donor, an option he/she would be free to exer-
cise. Id. at 63.
See supra notes 56-77 and accompanying text.
Butler, supra note 41, at 200-01 (noting that, "[a]lthough logically appealing . . .
as a means for increasing the availability of organs without significant government
intrusion . . . the bottom line is that our society is simply not comfortable with the
concept [of organ sales]").
"' Note the difference between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction: prescriptive
jurisdiction allows one state to enact a law that may apply to a person who is not a
national nor within the territory of the promulgating state. Enforcement jurisdiction is
the ability to enforce that law within a territory. While a state may have prescriptive
jurisdiction, it may not have enforcement jurisdiction since the person the state wishes
to prosecute is within another state's territory. Since it would be a violation of the
foreign state's sovereignty for the prosecuting state to attempt to enforce its laws in the
other state's territory, the prosecuting state must either ask the foreign state's per-
mission to enter and apprehend the suspect, ask the foreign state to extradite the
suspect, or hope that the suspect enters the prosecuting state's territory. But see United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (holding that the abduction by the
United States of a suspect in the murder of a United States DEA agent from Mexico
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state sovereignty, since it is recognized as international law that only the
domestic state has the right to promulgate and enforce laws within its
territory. There are, however, five different principles by which one state
can exercise prescriptive jurisdiction within another state: the territorial
principle, nationality principle, passive personality principle, universal
principle, and protective principle. Briefly explained, the territorial princi-
ple requires that some part of the action"' occurs within the territory of
the prosecuting stateY3 The nationality principle gives the prosecuting
state jurisdiction to apply a domestic law to a national in a foreign
state. 4 The passive personality principle requires that one of the prose-
cuting state's nationals is injured by the national of another state. 5 The
state applying the protective principle seeks to prosecute a foreign nation-
al for actions that are injurious to the sovereignty of the prosecuting state,
though not to any one national in particular. 6 Finally, the universal
was not a violation of the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty or of Mexico's sovereignty).
232 For purposes of this Note, "action" will refer to any criminal or tortious act.
z Mali v. Keeper of the Common Jail (Wildenhus' Case), 120 U.S. 1 (1887). The
United States was held to have legislative jurisdiction over the murder of one Belgian
by another Belgian aboard a Belgian ship docked in Jersey City, New Jersey. The
Court stated that
if crimes are committed on board [a foreign ship] of a character to disturb the peace
and tranquillity of the country to which the vessel has been brought, the offenders have
never, by comity or usage, been entitled to any exemption from the operation of the lo-
cal laws for their punishment.
Id. at 8.
" Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 443 (1932). The U.S. Supreme Court
held Blackmer, a United States national living in France, in contempt of court for
refusing to appear after being issued a subpoena. The Court felt that it cannot "be
doubted that the United States possesses the power inherent in sovereignty to require
the return to this country of a citizen, resident elsewhere, whenever the public interest
requires it, and to penalize him in case of refusal." Id. at 437.
" United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988). The United States was
deemed to have jurisdiction over Yunis, a Lebanese national accused of hijacking a
Jordanian aircraft carrying three American nationals. The court used the alternative
grounds of both passive personality jurisdiction - based on the three Americans that
were taken hostage - and universal jurisdiction - based on piracy - to justify legis-
lative jurisdiction by the United States. The court noted that only "serious and
universally condemned crimes" should be used as the basis for pursuing passive
personality legislative jurisdiction, so as to avoid "unlimited and unexpected criminal
liability." Id. at 902.
' United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990). Manuel Noriega,
former head of State of Panama, was found to be under the legislative jurisdiction of
the United States under the protective, or objective extraterritoriality principle, for
various narcotics offenses. The Court noted that "international law principles have
expanded to permit jurisdiction upon a mere showing to produce effects in this country,
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principle applies to those crimes deemed so heinous as to be crimes
against all states, and prosecutable by any state. 37 Determining whether
a state may exercise legislative jurisdiction over the nationals of another
state for possible human rights violations or other crimes related to the
illegal transplantation of an organ is crucial; for without the legislative
jurisdiction to prosecute, there can be no further cause of action.
In determining whether a statute can be affected extraterritorially, it
is necessary to ask three questions: (1) does the statute purport to reach
the particular conduct? (2) will the extraterritorial application of the
statute raise serious issues about its constitutionality, or be a violation of
customary or conventional international law? and (3) will expansive
interpretation of the statute's reach pose a risk of serious conflict with
other countries? 8 It is important to avoid statutory overreach, and to
keep within the general interests of the international community as a
whole. 9 For a country to try to do otherwise may be seen as an at-
tempt to violate the sovereignty of another country, and may constitute a
violation of international law. Consequently, there are not as many dif-
ficulties in applying extraterritorial jurisdiction using the nationality
principle24 or the territorial principle,24' as there are in establishing a
passive personality, protectionist, or universal theory of jurisdiction. Since
most states that seek to legislate organ procurement and transplantation
already explicitly include their national's activities within their own terri-
tory,242 this section will focus on the other three theories of jurisdiction,
passive personality, protective principle, and universal principle. It will
also focus on how a state can justify prescriptive jurisdiction under each
theory. Section VI will recommend what type of laws would best create
extraterritorial jurisdiction.
without requiring proof of an overt act or effect within the United States." Id. at 1513.
" Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). The United States was ruled
to have legislative jurisdiction under the universal principle in a case where one Para-
guayan was suing another Paraguayan for acts of torture that occurred in Paraguay. Id.
The Court noted that "[a]mong the rights universally proclaimed by all nations ...
is the right to be free of physical torture. Indeed, for the purposes of civil liability, the
torturer has become - like the pirate and slave trader before him - hostis humani
generis - an enemy of all mankind." Id. at 890.
21 HENRY J. STEINER & DETLEV F. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 813-
14 (3d ed. 1986).
21 Id. at 814.
240 A national of a state is considered property of the state under international law.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(2)
(1987).
241 Id. § 402(1).
242 See supra notes 56-77 and accompanying text.
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A. Passive Personality
The passive personality principle seeks to protect a state's nationals
from serious and universally recognized crimes2 43 when they travel
abroad.2"4 In order for this theory to apply, a harm needs to have been
suffered on the part of the national. Possible harms that a national could
suffer by obtaining an organ transplant extraterritorially include a doctor's
negligence,245 failure to obtain informed consent,2' and assault and
battery.247 Additionally, a national who travels abroad to donate an
organ can suffer not only these same harms, but in the case of cadaveric
donations, death can be falsely ascertained, the corpse can be mutilat-
ed,2" or the national can be murdered for the organ.249
Physicians conducting organ transplantation are, like any other
physician, subject to the duty of care established by the "general prin-
ciples of the legal system to which the surgeon is subject." ' Such a
standard has been interpreted to require that the physician be qualified to
perform the transplantation, the operation must be absolutely essential,
and all other more conventional methods of treatment have failed."
Additionally, the physician has the duty to insure that the organ is fresh
and does not harbor any infectious diseases that can be passed to the
recipient. 2 The problem with trying to prosecute a physician from
another jurisdiction, however, is that the physician owes the patient a
standard of care as proscribed by his legal system, not the patient's; to
hold otherwise would not put the physician on notice that he was at risk
for liability. On the other hand, prosecuting a physician under his own
country's duty of care standard might at best be considered a difficult
choice of law question, and at worst, a breach of that country's sover-
211 Id. at 902.
24 See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988).
245 Norrie, supra note 172, at 443-48.
246 Id. at 449-56.
247 M. L. Norton et al., Organ Transplantation: Medico-Legal Considerations, 2
MED. & L. 291, 292 (1983).
248 Id. at 292.
249 See supra notes 31-77 and accompanying text.
' Norrie, supra note 172, at 443.
2' Id. at 444.
Thus, if a patient's kidney failure would possibly have been susceptible to drug
treatment, but a doctor recommends and carries out a renal transplantation, then the
patient may have a good ground of action if the operation leaves him worse off than
he would have been had the drug treatment been provided.
Id.
252 Id. at 445.
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eignty. The best possibility for establishing negligence, then, is if the doc-
tor and the patient are subject to the same jurisdictional definition of
negligence and if the doctor is on notice of the duty of care owed to the
patient owed. 3 Absent some universal standard of care for a transplan-
tation operation, however, it is unlikely that such circumstances would
arise.
Physician liability for failing to obtain the informed consent of the
patient also suffers from the lack of an international standard; rather, "the
development of informed consent is strongly based on traditional Amer-
ican moral and legal concepts of basic human rights." 4 Failure to
obtain informed consent is a tort,255 as well as an element in an action
for assault and battery.26 There are two elements to informed consent:
the physician's duty of disclosure and the patient's consent for the pro-
posed treatment.z 7 To constitute disclosure, the physician must tell the
patient (1) the type of treatment proposed; (2) the complications of that
procedure or treatment; (3) any alternatives to the treatment; (4) the
benefits that the physician hopes to derive; and (5) the probable outcome
if the procedure is not carried out." In the case of organ trans-
plantation, this would include, in particular, the risks of organ rejection
by the body, the consequences if nothing is done, and the alternatives,
such as drug therapies.2" For the donor-patient, not only do these same
elements apply, but there is also a concern that the donor potentially does
not have the capacity to consent because of infancy or incompetence.'
There are also fears that the donor's consent could be coerced, through
either familial pressure,"' economic strife,' 2 or some other method.
" This would be the case, for example, if the doctor received schooling in the
patient's jurisdiction.
14 William J. Morton, The Doctrine of Informed Consent, 6 MED. & L. 117, 117
(1987).
's Id. at 122. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
256 Norton et al., supra note 247, at 292.
' Morton, supra note 254, at 118.
2" Id. at 119. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786-88.
'" Norrie, supra note 172, at 451. Even the consequences of success need disclo-
sure, such as the necessity to take anti-rejection drugs for the rest of the recipient's
life. Id.
I6 d. at 453-54.
"6 Norton et al. supra note 247, at 294.
12 MEYERS, supra note 16, at 201. In India, Dr. K.C. Reddy tests potential organ
sellers. He gives them intelligence tests and has them interviewed by a psychologist to
be certain that he has their informed consent. However, it is questionable if the consent
truly is informed. One interview with a mother whose husband had already sold one
of his kidneys went like this:
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Again, absent some universal standard requiring informed consent, it
would be difficult to gain extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Finally, there are the crimes of mutilation of the corpse, death falsely
ascertained, and murder of a national for his organs. The latter two fit
under the more generalized crime of murder, for which passive personali-
ty jurisdiction may be obtained. However, even though it is possible to
attain jurisdiction in this manner, there remains the question of whether
a foreign state's sovereignty would be violated by prosecuting that state's
national for the murder, especially since there would probably be concur-
rent jurisdiction over the crime. The crime of mutilation or desecration of
a corpse suffers from the same defect that negligence and informed
consent do; varying legal standards from jurisdiction to jurisdiction make
it impossible to establish an internationally recognized legal standard from
which to prosecute.
B. Protective Principle
The protective principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction allows a state's
laws to apply to actions occurring within other states, or within interna-
tional space, due to those actions' deleterious effect upon the first
state.263 The law to be applied needs to be examined to determine
whether it was intended to apply extraterritorially. If the failure to
recognize extraterritorial application would frustrate the aims of the
statute, then the protective principle probably applies.2" This principle
Interviewer. Why are you selling your kidney?
Woman: Because they don't have a kidney.
Interviewer. Do you know where the kidney is?
Woman: In the side.
Interviewer: How many are there?
Woman: They say there are two.
Interviewer: What work do they do?
Woman: I don't know.
Interviewer:. We hold things with our hands. So what do the kidneys do?
Woman: I don't know. I haven't been to school; if I'd been, I'd know.
Organ Bazaar, supra note 13.
263 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The Court
noted that "it is settled law that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons
not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within
its borders which the state reprehends." Id. at 443.
2 Mortensen v. Peters, 5 Sess. Ca.(J) 121, 141 (Edwin Adam ed., 1906). The court
allowed the extraterritorial application of a prohibition on trawling within a body of
water that was mostly outside of British jurisdiction, for the reason that the object of
the statute would be frustrated "by a construction of the enactment which, while it re-
strained British subjects from trawling within any part of the protected area ...
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has been expanded even further to include "a mere showing of intent to
produce effects within [another] country, without requiring proof of an
overt act or effect .... ." Applying this principle to organ transplanta-
tion, either a deleterious effect, or the intent to create such an effect by
a person within another state,' would merit use of the state's domestic
law. In addition, a state would need to have a law directly prohibiting the
activity, and this law would have to be deemed to apply extraterritorially;
too indirect or tangential an effect would not be actionable. As the U.S.
Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated concerning the application of U.S.
antitrust law abroad:
Almost any limitation of the supply of goods in Europe, for exam-
ple ... may have repercussions if there is trade between the two. Yet
when one considers the international complications likely to arise from
an effort in this country to treat such agreements as unlawful, it is safe
to assume that Congress did not intend the [Sherman] Act to cover
them.267
In order to apply the protective principle to organ sales, it is neces-
sary to examine some of the statutes nations have passed in making organ
sales illegal. For example, a statute like Singapore's most likely would
not be found to have extraterritorial effect, since it neither explicitly states
that sales abroad are illegal, nor does its language imply that the failure
to construe an extraterritorial meaning frustrate the statute's purpose.6'
However, a statute like Great Britain's, which states:
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if in Great Britain he (a) makes or
receives any payment for the supply of, or for an offer to supply, an
organ which has been or is to be removed from a dead or living person
and is intended to be transplanted into another person whether in Great
permitted foreigners to trawl as they pleased over the greater part of it." Id.
United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1513 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
For example, trafficking an organ to another state, or transplanting diseased
organs into nationals of other states who have traveled abroad to receive the organ and
then return to their domestic state with the diseased organ.
27 148 F.2d at 443.
' Sixth Parliament Report, supra note 66, pt. IV, § 14.
(I) Subject to this section, a contract or arrangement under which a person agrees, for
valuable consideration . . . to the sale or supply of any organ or blood from his body
or the body of another person . . . shall be void. (2) A person who enters into a
contract or arrangement of th[is] kind . . . shall be guilty of an offense.
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Britain or elsewhere,269 explicitly intends extraterritorial effect. Another
example would be the U.S. statute prohibiting organ sales from entering
interstate commerce,27 which defines interstate commerce as "com-
merce between any State or Territory and any place outside thereof."'
Applying the protective principle to the transplantation of a diseased
organ, however, is more difficult because none of the statutes on organ
transplantation specifically prohibit such an act; rather, most countries
appear to rely on standard tort remedies for negligence to regulate this
act.272 This does not mean that there is no harm occurring. It was re-
ported that from 1986 to May, 1991, 150 Singaporeans had gone to India
or China for transplants and returned with infections or diseases such as
tuberculosis, malaria, chicken pox, hepatitis, or AIDS.273 Not only do
such transplants severely endanger the patient, but they also harm the
patient's domestic state, for when that patient returns home immediate
treatment is needed for both the diseased organ which must be removed
- and if possible, replaced - and for the illness contracted. One
possible way to prosecute such occurrences is through the prosecution of
organ sales abroad, since these diseased organs are typically purchased.
However, it may also be possible to prosecute extraterritorially solely for
the implanting of diseased organs into a state's nationals, since this does
inflict a harm upon the domestic state.
269 Human Organ Transplants Act, 1989, ch. 31, § 1 (Eng.) (emphasis added).
270 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1988).
-1 21 U.S.C. § 321(b)(1) (1988).
272 See Norrie, supra note 172, at 443-48.
27 Risks to Buying Kidneys, STRAITs TIMES, May 13, 1992, at L3.
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C. Universal Principle
It is highly unlikely that any cause of action could be maintained
through the universal principle of jurisdiction, since this principle applies
to an extremely limited type of crimes. The universal principle is used to
prosecute crimes against states themselves, and has been restricted to
piracy, genocide, and most recently, torture.' Only the person who has
violated the "law of nations," a code governing the relationships between
states, can be prosecuted under this principle.275 There is no currently
recognized custom or practice of international law under which some
action relating to organ transplantation could give rise to universal
jurisdiction.
VI. SOLUTIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET FAILURE
Relying on the present international market to provide a sufficient
number of transplantable organs is clearly unacceptable. The practice of
problematic inter-vivos organ sales, coupled with generally inefficient and
unfollowed voluntary procurement systems, has proven ineffective at
meeting the goal of obtaining the maximum number of organs while
violating the fewest number of rights possible. What is needed is a
general system that can be adapted to fit an individual state's cultural,
ethical, and religious standards or constraints. Presumed consent of the
individual, coupled with an option to withdraw consent and a priority
incentive for those who do not withdraw consent, will provide the best,
safest, and least violative method of increasing organ supply. Additionally,
these factors provide a working model for uniform legislation regarding
extraterritorial jurisdiction, and also help decrease human rights transgres-
sions.
However, before an argument recommending presumed consent can
be made, it must be established that a state should have an organ pro-
curement system. Aside from the abuses that occur as a result of ineffec-
tive or nonexistent legislation outlined in Section III, there is also the
argument that people have a right to health care.276 Although the right
to health care does not fall within the traditional notions of human rights,
it does fall under a generalized notion of a right to life.2' The right to
health care will always be constrained by practical considerations, such as
2' Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
27s Id.
276 Amnon Carmi, Human Rights in Medicine and Law, 7 MED. & L. 409, 410
(1987) ("Good health is considered by many to be so important that it should become
regarded as the human right of every person.").
27 J.D. van der Vyver, The Right to Medical Care, 7 MED. & LAw 579, 580-81
(1989).
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the strength of a country's health care system and the frailties of the
human body. 8 This does not mean that a country cannot; at a mini-
mum, insure safe, sanitary organ transplantation; and, at most, insure that
a sufficient number of organs are procured so that most people can obtain
a life-saving organ for transplantation.279 Harmonizing organ procure-
ment legislation around the most effective and ethical means acceptable,
while simultaneously prohibiting activities such as organ commerce, will
best attain this right to a safe transplant.
The law that Singapore has enacted is an excellent example to
consider. Singapore's law is based upon the presumed consent of all citi-
zens to have their organs removed for transplantation in the event of
accidental death, except those who have opted-out; those who are below
the age of twenty-one, those who are above the age of sixty, those who
are incompetent, or who are Muslim." ° For those whose consent is not
presumed, it may either be given by a legal guardian - in the case of
minors and incompetents - or by opting-in - for Muslims and those
who had previously opted-out.' One lesson Singapore's legislature has
learned from the sale of organs, and which is incorporated into this law,
is that the lack of incentive to donate generates fewer donations. There-
fore, this Act gives priority to those who do not withdraw their consent
to posthumously donate their organs over those that do withdraw their
consent to donate organs in the event that two such people were in need
of the same organ. 2
As discussed previously, presumed consent, when strictly adhered to,
is the most efficient method of procuring organs. 3 Not only does such
a system provide more organs for transplantation, thereby saving more
lives, but it also eliminates other problems. For instance, an increase in
the supply of cadaveric organs would lead to improvements in tissue
matching between donor organs and recipients, as well as allowing
278 Carmi, supra note 276, at 411.
Del Bigio, supra note 162, at 69.
Because many transplant operations may now properly be regarded as being a part of
ordinary health care . . . it is in accordance with a person's right to health care that
a reasonable effort will be made to ensure that a person will be able to receive a trans-
plant when needed. This means that . . . there exists a system that will provide a
sufficient number of organs . . . for purposes of transplantation.
ld.
280 See Sixth Parliament Report, supra note 66, pt. II, § 5.
281 Id. §§ 5, 12.
Id. § 12. The law also provides that for those who opt-out, then opt back in,
there is a two-year waiting period before they obtain the same priority as a presumed
consenter. Id.
211 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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surgeons to be more selective about which organs are procured." Con-
trary to some criticisms, presumed consent allows for more careful ap-
plication of brain-death criteria, since the increased supply of donor
organs eliminates any temptation to obtain organs through "inappropriate"
methods 5 In countries like the United States, which has a federally
funded dialysis program 6 which has climbed in cost to taxpayers from
$228.5 million in 1974 to almost $2 billion in 1982' 7 to close to $4
billion a year as of 1992,288 a presumed consent system would result in
lower costs to the government. It currently costs $32,000 per year for
dialysis for one patient, as compared to $56,000 for the first year of a
kidney transplant, and $6,000 per year thereafter. 9 Additionally, as kid-
ney transplantation becomes a more practiced therapy, one can expect
costs to fall even further.2" Increased cadaveric procurement numbers
would also reduce the current reliance on the living donor."'
There are other advantages to a presumed consent system that
proponents of procurement systems - such as altruism and organ sales
- try to obscure by criticizing as unethical. For example, many critics
charge the presumed consent system takes advantage of "reluctant" or
"procrastinating" dissenters, in that those who delay opting-out for
whatever reason end up not truly expressing their desire to opt-out. This,
however, is not an ethical problem that should concern the state any more
than the state should be concerned about someone who, after having
federal taxes withheld by the government, does not actively pursue their
right to a refund of any overpayment.
Others are more concerned that the presumption itself is a problem,
in that it restricts or in some way takes away an individual's freedom,
and could somehow lead to a cheapening of human life. 2 It would
Blair & Kaserman, supra note 17, at 429.
Butler, supra note 41, at 204.
See Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 202, 102 Stat. 683 (1988).
Blair & Kaserman, supra note 17, at 409.
Fox & SWAZEY, supra note 25, at 76.
'9 Id. at 75. See also Organ Prices Quadrupling, U.S. Study Says, ToRoNTo STAR,
June 23, 1993, at A32. According to a U.S. study, "[r]oughly $1.5 billion was spent
last year on the 16,475 U.S. organ transplant operations and the after-care of pa-
tients . . . . The study found that the median hospital charges for organ [procurement]
in 1988 [was] $12,290 for a kidney, $12,578 for a heart, $16,281 for a liver, and
$15,400 for a pancreas." The study found that these charges were often four times the
actual cost, due to the fact that insurance companies and Medicare leave unspecified as
to what is an allowable expenditure for an organ. Id.
' Blair & Kaserman, supra note 17, at 430.
29 Id.
2 LAMB, supra note 21, at 140.
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seem that this can be true only if society in general was opposed to the
idea of organ transplantation donation. However, polls in Singapore,293
295 296Canada,294 Great Britain, and the United States, as well as other
countries, have shown that as a society we do not oppose organ donation,
but support it as a therapy for organ failure. General support for organ
donation, coupled with the fact that presumed consent allows for an
individual to opt-out, would seem to counter such an argument. If any-
thing, presumed consent with the ability to opt-out affirms an individual's
freedom by expressly ensuring that a donor's wishes are respected, instead
of allowing the next of kin to either donate, or forbid donation, of an
individual's organs after death. 97
Other critics claim that eliminating altruistic feelings that the positive
act of donation provides would be a loss that even increased organ
numbers could not justify.2 8 Such a belief indicates that (1) a person
cannot experience any sort of altruistic feelings by simply remaining
within the donation system, and (2) the state has no right to enact a law
that will reflect the altruistic nature of society. Many countries, in times
of war, enact civilian draft laws to increase military enlistment. These
individuals, though drafted, often experience altruistic feelings of patrio-
tism, as does the rest of society. Assuming society is in favor of organ
donation, why would similar patriotic feelings not develop? An even more
basic argument for supporting the altruistic nature of a presumed consent
system is that it would be consistent with traditional humanist values on
the presumption that one favors life and life-saving; putting the burden on
293 Sixth Parliament Report, supra note 66, at A8 (noting that 85% are in favor of
organ donation).
294 ONTARIO MINISTRY OF HEALTH, supra note 146, at 41 (noting that "62% of indi-
viduals would [donate their own organs] . . . [and] approximately 20-30% in any
population surveyed is opposed to giving consent for their own organ donation, and
presumably they would record 'no'[]").
295 MEYERS, supra note 16, at 191 (noting that "75% of the surveyed British public
express a willingness to donate their organs after death to aid others ...... ).
' Cohen, supra note 6, at 9 (noting that "[a] 1985 Gallup poll estimated that 75%
of all American adults approved of the concept of organ donation and transplanta-
tion[]").
' Sixth Parliament Report, supra note 66, at A8-A9 ("[Presumed consent] is not
against individual freedom. Instead it reaffirms the individual Singaporean's ownership
of and responsibility for his own body. People are therefore better able to ensure that
their wishes are followed because their and not their next of kin's acceptance or
objection has to be respected.").
" Del Bigio, supra note 162, at 69 ("Thus, concerns of efficacy will always be
constrained by the moral considerations of donation as a gift, sensitivity and compas-
sion, and autonomy.").
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the individual who would deny someone life by withdrawing consent for
organ removal. 99
Another benefit of a presumed consent system is that it would be an
easier system to manage than the traditional voluntary consent. If there
was no registered objection to organ removal, the physician removing the
organ could proceed without contacting the deceased's next of kin for
consent. If doctors were assured they were on solid legal ground, they
could proceed with the organ removal without the hesitation that plagues
French doctors." Shortening the time between death and determination
of consent also insures that the organ is as fresh as possible, increasing
the transplant's chance for success. But, perhaps the biggest advantage to
doctors is that they would not feel inhibited in initiating the donor
process, since they would not have to "bother" a grieving family when
the family is arguably not prepared to make decisions concerning organ
donation."' While it is not hard to envision a family perhaps becoming
upset because they did not get to participate in this critical choice, this
problem can be overcome by (1) educating the public about the presumed
consent law; (2) telling the family that if the deceased had wished to give
or withdraw consent for organ removal, the deceased would have done so
during life; and (3) assuring the family that the organ will be used to
save another person's life. Complete public education is not only impera-
tive in gaining the support of the next of kin, but also in insuring that
each individual is aware of their own right to opt-out if they choose.
While harmonizing legislation around a presumed consent model
would help to insure that each nation's procurement system was working
effectively, it is also imperative that effective prohibitions on organ sales,
especially those that sink to the level of human rights violations, are
passed and enforced. While many nations have passed prohibitions on
organ sales, few have written their statutes such that extraterritorial
jurisdiction can be obtained. Illegal organ sales directly harm nations
operating under a presumed consent system because such sales only serve
to undermine the low-cost, safe, equitable, and efficient alternative offered
by presumed consent. Using the protective principle of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, it would not be difficult for nations with statutes prohibiting
organ sales to prosecute those that engage in such commerce
extraterritorially.
Butler, supra note 41, at 204-05.
See Gerson, supra note 146.
' M.A. Robinette et al., Donation Process, in ONTARIO MINISTRY OF HEALTH,
ORGAN DONATION IN THE EIGHTIES: THE MINISTER'S TASK FORCE ON KIDNEY
DONATION 91, 97 (1986) (noting that 50% of doctors and nurses felt inhibited by initi-
ating the donation process).
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VII. CONCLUSION
An international system as complex and interactive as the one
proposed can not occur immediately. States must act domestically to enact
legislation that aims to maximize organ procurement while minimizing
rights violations. States acting to strengthen domestic markets will in
effect strengthen the international market by limiting the incentive for
abuse to their organ supply through sloppy, illegal sales to foreigners.
Presumed consent is the most efficient and least violative of the procure-
ment methods currently in existence, and should be adopted by nations
worldwide in conjunction with a ban on all organ sales.
